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-The Business Jud . · ent Rule, Disclosure, and 
Executive Compensation 
D.A. Jeremy Telman· 
Despite its ubiquity in corporate Jaw; the business judgment rule remains a doctrinal 
puzzle. Both courts and scholars offer different unde1"St1mdings of the Rules role in litigation 
brought against corporate directors and different justifications for its deployment to insulate 
such directors livm liability for breaches of fiduciary duties. 11Jis Article rejects all existing 
justifications for the Rule and argues that the Rule is no longer needed to protect directors fivm 
liabilit}j either because the justifications offered never made any sense or because directors are 
now protected by other, statufOJY means. Rather, the Rule is needed today not to protect 
directors, but the corpomtions they serve fivm the i11eparable hann corporations would suffer if 
forr:ed to disclose prospective business plans in order to defend decisions taken by their boards. 
This Article follows some recent scholarship in arguing that the Rule is best undeJ'Stood as an 
abstention doctrine and argues that cowts should invoke the Rule and abstain fivm the reliew of 
the business judgment of corporate directors when the litigation that gives rise to such rewew 
would compel the corporation to disclose info1111ation relating to its prospective business plans. 
The Article then Illustrates why the Rule should not apply in cases involving challenges to board 
decisions relating to executive compensation through a detaJJed discussion of the ongoing 
litigation relating to the hiring and dismissal of the Walt Disney Companys fo1111er Presiden~ 
Michael Ovitz. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article contends that none of the conventional justifications 
for the business judgment rule (Rule) are entirely satisfactory, because 
the Rule is ordinarily defended as necessary to protect corporations' 
directors from liability, and directors are already protected by other 
means. Instead, this Article seeks to rethink the Rule as a means of 
protecting corporations from irreparable harms caused by litigation. 
This Article thus proposes that the Rule be aggressively conceived as a 
doctrine of abstention, pursuant to which courts refrain from 
substantive review of a board's decisions as long as the decision-
making process was proper. However, this Article would limit 
application of the Rule to cases where disclosure of the decision-
making process involved in the challenged business decision would. 
require disclosure of prospective business plans. In order to illustrate 
one area where its proposal would make a difference in the deployment 
of the Rule, the Article focuses on one case involving allegations that a 
board breached its duty of c.are in connection with the approval of an 
executive compensation package. Because decisions relating to 
executive compensation generally do not involve prospective business 
plans, the Rule should not apply to preclude substantive review of 
board decisions relating to such compensation. 
Part II of this Article points out the general weaknesses in the 
leading justifications of the Rule. In Part ID.A, the Article proposes a 
different justification for the Rule: the need to protect corporations 
against disclosures of prospective business strategies underlying 
corporate decision making. However, the Article contends that the 
Rule should not protect corporations from disclosures in connection 
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with challenges to executive compensation. Finally, Part TII.B looks at 
the suit brought by shareholders of the Walt Disney Company 
(Disney), alleging breaches of fiduciary duties in connection with the 
Disney board's decision to hire Michael Ovitz as the company's 
president and then to pay hitn $140 million in severance upon his 
termination after only fourteen months in office.• 
IT. WEAKNESSES IN 'I'HE DOCTRINAL EDIFICE 
Pursuant to the Rule, courts generally defer to decisions taken by 
corporate directors, whether they relate to mergers and acquisitions,2 
paying out of dividends,3 charitable donations,4 or executive 
compensation/ as long as: (1) a business decision was made, (2) in 
good faith, (3) after the director reasonably informed herself, and 
1. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005), 
aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("The stockholder plaintiffs have alleged that the director 
defendants breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the 1995 hiring and 1996 
tennination of Michael Ovitz as President of The Walt Disney Company."). This Article was 
conceived and written before the Delaware Supreme Court decision of June 8, 2006, 
aftutning the judgment of the chancery court. In re Disney, 906 A.2d 27. This Article has 
not been revised in light of the supreme court's decision, because the supreme court affirmed 
not only the conclusion but also the reasoning of the chancery court. 
2. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) ('~[T]he 
[Rule], including the standards by which director conduct is judged, is applicable in the 
context of a takeover."); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985) ("While suit 
might result from the rejection of a merger or tender offer, Delaware law makes clear that a 
board acting within the ambit of the [Rule] faces no ultimate liability."). 
3. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (holding that, in 
the absence of self-dealing, the business~judgment standard applies to a parent corporation's 
decision to have its subsidiary declare dividends); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 
682 (Mich. 1919) ('"It is a well-recognized principle of law that the directors of a 
corporation, and they alone, have the power to declare a dividend of the earnings of the 
corporation, and to determine its amount."' (quoting Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 47 
N.W. 131, 134 (Mich. 1890))); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N'~Y.S.2d 807, 810 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct.), affd, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) ("[T]he question of whether or not a 
dividend is to be declared or a distribution of some kind should be made is exclusively a 
matter of business judgment for the Board of Directors."); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 
692, 695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947) (refusing to substitute the judgment of the court for that of the 
corporation's board of directors as to whether dividends should be declared). 
4. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953) (sustaining a 
corporation's charitable contribution to a privately supported educational institution where 
there was no evidence that the contribution was made indiscriminately or in furtherance of 
the personal objectives of corporate directors). 
5. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (noting that a board of 
directors' business decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational 
business purpose in upholding the board's approval of a large severance package for the 
corporation's former president); In re Disney, 901 A.2d at 771 (finding that the former 
Disney board properly exercised its business judgment and did not violate any fiduciary 
duties when it elected Ovitz as president after being informed of who Ovitz was, the key 
terms of his employment agreement, and the reporting structure to which Ovitz had agreed). 
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( 4) the director had no financial interest in the decision at issue.6 
Despite its ubiquity in the jurisprudence of corporate law, the Rule 
remains a doctrinal puzzle.7 Scholars struggle towards a unified theory 
to justify the Rule's multiple applications, but this leads to doctrinal 
incoherence. 8 
The most compelling explanation of how the Rule ought to be 
conceptualized is the notion of the Rule as an abstention doctrine.9 So 
conceived, the Rule cuts off litigation before the court engages in any 
substantive review of the board's decision.10 As an abstention doctrine, 
the Ru1e serves its fundamental purpose of protecting corporations 
from the expense of suits that challenge decisions that are within the 
purview of a corporation's board of directors.'' However, courts rarely 
6. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention 
Doctrine, 51 VAND. L. REv. 83, 83 (2004) ("The [Rule] pervades every aspect of state 
corporate law, from the review of allegedly negligent decisions by directors, to self-dealing 
transactions, to board decisions to seek dismissal of shareholder litigation, and so on.,'); 
Meredith M. Brown & William D. Regner, JWJats Happening to the Business Judgment 
Rule?, INSIGHTS, Aug. 2003, at 2 ("Courts have traditionally deferred to the business 
judgment of directors, if the directors act in good faith, with loyalty to the corporation, and on 
an informed basis."); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and 
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 437, 441 (1993) (setting forth 
four conditions that must be met for the Rule to apply: (1) a judgment has been made, (2) the 
director has employed a reasonable decision-making process, (3) the decision has been made 
in subjective good faith, and ( 4) no fmancial conflicts of interest exist). 
7. See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 279-88 (2000) (swnrnari-
zing cases that range from treating the Rule as akin to an ordinary negligence standard to 
cases that hold that the Rule precludes them from substantive review of business decisions); 
Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 84 ("[D]espite all of the attention lavished on it, the [Rule] 
remains poorly wtderstood.;'); R., Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the 
Business Judgment Rule, 48 Bus. LAw~ 1337, 1337-40 (1993) (noting the lack of consensus 
on the meaning of the [Rule]); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: 
Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 287, 287-88 (1994) 
(remarking on the lack of consensus as to what the Rule really is). 
8. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 84 ("We lack a coherent and unified theory 
that explains why the rule exists and where its limits should be placed.''); Kenneth B. Davis, 
Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REv. 573, 573 ("[T]housands of 
. . 
pages of corporate law scholarship . . . have been devoted to these fimdamental questions 
[regarding the Rule], yet we remain short of any broad consensus as to the answers."). 
9. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 87 ("[T]he [R ]ule is better understood as a doctrine 
of abstention pursuant to which courts in fact refrain from reviewing board decisions unless 
exacting preconditions for review are satisfied."). 
10. See id at 128 ("If the [Rule] is framed as an abstention doctrine, however, 
judicial review is more likely to be the exception rather than the rule."). 
11. See Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 306 (stating that even if a defendant prevails in a 
suit brought by shareholders, the litigation will be expensive); cf. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 
244, 265 (Del 2000) (stating that Disney's board had an argument for firing Ovitz for cause 
but persuading the court to accept the argwnent would involve expensive litigation, 
distraction of executive time and company resources, lost opportunity eosts, more bad 
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treat the Rule as an abstention doctrine, preferring to characterize it 
either as an evidentiary guideline or a standard of review. 12 
One major problem with cowts' use of the Rule is that the 
justifications of the Rule now mostly focus on the need to protect the 
interests of the corporate directors rather than on protecting the 
interests of the corporation itself. Most legal scholars' discussions of 
the justifications of the Rule similarly focus on why directors must 
benefit from the Rule's protection rather than on why the Rule is 
necessary to protect the interests of corporations and their 
shareholders. 13 
The following discussion aims to cut through the doctrinal 
confusion that has arisen from courts' attempts to use the Rule to 
protect directors rather than corporations. In Part II.A, this Article 
illustrates how the Rule has been variously conceived as a presumption 
and as a standard of review. If the Rule is so understood, courts 
necessarily engage in substantive review of board decisions. In the 
end, courts generally defer to those decisions but only after the 
corporation has suffered the expense and reputational hanns associated 
with protracted litigation. Thus, the Ru1e would better protect the 
interests of corporations if more consistently applied as an abstention 
doctrine. In Part II.B, this Article critiques existing justifications for 
the Rule, all of which focus on the need to protect directors rather than 
on the need to protect corporations. Concluding that all of these 
justifications are unsatisfactory, the Article then introduces a new 
substantive justification for the Rule: the Rule is necessary to protect 
corporations only when the discovery process attendant to litigation 
would compel the corporation to disclose its prospective business 
plans. 
A. ConiiJsion as to the Nature of the Rule 
Part of the difficulty that courts face in ,applying the Rule is that 
there is no agreement as to what it is, except that all seem agreed that 
the Rule is not a rule .. 14 In Aronson v. Lewis, the Delaware Supreme 
publicity, and an outcome that was uncertain at best and, at worst, could have resulted in 
damages against the company). 
12. See discussion infta Part II.A. 
13. See discussion iniTa Part II.B.l-2. 
14. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.; 907 A.2d 693, 746-47 (Del. Ch. 2005), 
aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("The [Rule] is not actually a substantive rule of law.~~."); 
Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that Isn't a Rule The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. 
L. REv. 631, 631 (2002) ("The much misWlderstood [Rule] is not a 'rule' at all.''). 
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Court described the Rule essentially as an evidentiary presumption in 
favor of directors, characterizing the Rule as 
a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. 
Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the 
courts. The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish 
. facts rebutting the presumption.15 
The presumption applies only when there is no evidence of fraud, bad 
faith, or self-dealing on the part of the directors. 16 When the plaintiff 
fails to rebut the presumption, "she is not entitled to any remedy, be it 
legal or equitable, unless the transaction constitutes waste."17 However, 
although the Delaware Supreme Court repeatedly states that the Rule 
is really an evidentiary presumption, 18 the strength of the presumption 
is unclear. 19 Because a plaintiff always bears the evidentiary burden, it 
. 
15. 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted); see Branson, supra note 14, at 
632 ("Most generally, the [Rule] acts as a presumption in favor of corporate managers' 
actions.''). The Aronson court relied on two earlier cases, Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 
119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971 ), and Robinson v. Pittsburgh 011 Refining Corp., 126 A. 46, 48 (Del. 
Ch. 1924 ), in support of its interpretation of the Rule as a "preswnption." See Balotti & 
Hanks, supra note 7, at 1341 ("The reader of these opinions is left with the suspicion that the 
term presumption in the early opinions was introduced in its colloquial rather than its 
evidentiary sense and then carried forward without further consideration."). But the 
presumption approach to the Rule has also been adopted by other courts. Se~ e.g., Panter v. 
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981) ('''When [directors] act in good 
faith, they enjoy a presumption of sound business judgment, reposed in them as directors, 
which courts will not disturb if any rational business purpose can be attributed to their 
decisions.'" (quoting Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1194 (N.D. Ill. 
1980)) ); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 E2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Under the [Rule], 
directors are presumed to have acted properly and in good faith .... "); Johnson v. Trueblood, 
629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[I]f actions are arguably taken for the benefit of the 
corporation, then the directors are preswned to have been exercising their sound business 
judgment .... ''); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) ("The authority and 
responsibilities vested in corporate directors both by statute and decisional law proceed on the 
assumption that inescapably there can be no available obJective standard by which the 
correctness of every corporate decision may be measured, by the courts or otherwise."); 1 
DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE 
DIRECTORS 22-24 (5th ed. 1998) (citing cases from twenty-five jurisdictions other than 
Delaware where courts have treated the Rule as a presumption in favor of a board having 
acted with due care). 
16. In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 747 (citing Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 
1988)). 
17. ld 
18. See 1 BLOCK ET AL., supm note 15, at 20-21 (citing over twenty cases from the 
Delaware Supreme Court reiterating its view that the Rule is a presumption). 
19. See id at 25-32 (discussing the nature of the presumption and the effect on 
litigation when that presumption is overcome); Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 13 78 (Del. 
1996) ("Only by demonstrating that the Board breached its fiduciary duties may the 
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is not clear how treating the Rule as a presumption adds an · g to 
that burden.20 
Kenneth Davis defines the Rule quite lucidly as "a doctrine 
holding that directors of corporations should not be liable for what 
amounts to a good faith exercise of business judgment, even if other 
boards might have reached a con conclusion.''21 The Rule is thus a 
means of allocating the risk of business judgments to shareholders 
rather than directors. 22 This seems straightforward enough~ but once 
again it is not clear how courts are to apply the Rule so understood. As 
Davis sets-out the Rule, it could simply mean that boards will not be 
liable for a good faith business decision, even if that decision has 
disastrous consequences for the corporation, as long as the board's 
decision was not a negligent one. 
Confusion over the applicable standard is exacerbated because, as 
Melvin Eisenberg points out, there is a divergence between the 
standard of conduct (our expectations of directors) and the standard of 
review that a court will apply in determining whether a board's 
conduct gives rise to liability.23 In setting out the standard of care, the 
Model Business Corporation Act of 1998 states that directors, in using 
their business judgment, are to exercise "the care an ordinarily prudent 
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances."24 
presumption of the [Rule] be rebutted .... "). But see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 
872-73 (Del. 1985} (requiring that plaintiffs establish the board acted with gross negligence 
in order to rebut the Rule's presumption). 
20. See Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 291-92 (arguing that the presumption is nothing 
more than a burden of proof and noting that "the proposition that the plaintiff, in any context, 
has the burden ofproving his or her prima facie case is a rule with which every frrst-year law 
student should be familiar"). 
21. Davis, supmnote-8, at 573. 
22. Id at 573-74. 
23. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 467 (concluding that the standard of conduct for 
directorS is that they must act in good faith and in the interests of the corporation, but 
standards of review may be relaxed, intermediate, or demanding, depending on the nature of 
the business judgment being reviewed); see 1 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 1-4 ("[T]he 
duty of care requires that directors exercise the care that a person in a like position would 
exercise Wlder similar circumstances . . . . The [Rule] is a standard of judicial review for 
director conduct, not a standard of conduct.");. William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard 
of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Cntique ofVan Gorkom 
and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 449, 450-51 (2002) 
(noting that in corporation law the standard of conduct and standard of review diverge in the 
area of due care). 
24. MODEL Bus. CORR Acr § 8.30(a)(2) (1998); see Branson, supra note-14, at 631 
("The standard of conduct is not 'slight care,' or 'gross negligence,' or anything other than 
due care."). This standard.of care has been criticized as inappropriate given how boards work. 
See Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director~ Duty of Attention: 
Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1493 (1984). 
• 
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The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that the standard of care is 
"that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would 
use in similar circumstances."25 Few courts have held directors liable 
. . . . 
for breaches of this standard of care, but there is a considerable range 
in the standard of review applied.26 Standards of review applied under 
the Rule include "good faith, business judgment, prudence, 
negligence, gross negligence, waste, and faimess."27 New York courts 
have stated standards ranging from ordinary negligence28 to "good 
faith,;' that is, directors will not be liable as long as they thought their 
actions would benefit the company.29 
The Delaware courts also have not spoken with one voice when it 
comes to determining which standard of review applies. While fonner 
Chancellor William T. Allen contends that the proper standard is 
''gross negligence,"30 he concedes that courts do not seem to apply a 
25. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). 
26. Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 295 (stating the dominant interpretation of the Rule is as 
a standard of culpability but noting that "courts and commentators disagree on what the 
standard is or should be"). 
27. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 438. Eisenberg suggests that different standards of 
review might be appropriate depending on whether the relief sought is the imposition of 
liability on a director or merely injunctive relief. Id at 446. Scholarly arguments in support 
of such a rationale for different standards under the Rule date back to at least 1984, but 
Eisenberg can point to only "modest support" in case law for any link between the type of 
relief sought and the standard applied. See id at 445-47 (''[I]t is not clear that the 
employment of different standards of review in liability and validity contexts has caught hold 
in the context of ordinary business decisions."); Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 290-94 (arguing that 
treating the Rule as an ordinary negligence standard renders the Rule tautological). 
28. Sec Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 699 (N.Y; Sup~ Ct. 1940) ("Unless we are 
to do away entirely with the doctrine that directors of a bank are liable for negligence in 
administering its affairs liability should be imposed in connection with this transaction.;'). 
But see Franklin A. Gevurtz, Earnings Management and the Business Judgment Rule: :An 
Essay on Recent Corporate Scandals, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1261, 1266 (2004) 
(suggesting that the conduct at issue in Litwin actually involved gross negligence). 
29. See, e.g., Gewrtz, supra note 7, at 297 {citing New York cases using a bad faith 
standard of review). 
30. Allen et al., supra note 23, at 449. Allen and his coauthors criticize the Van 
Gorkom decision for giving ''insufficient weight to the substantive policy judginents 
underlying the gross negligence standard of review that governs whether corporate directors 
should be foWld liable for breaching their duty of care." Id (criticizing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1983)). Allen then praises the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000), for holding that courts should review directors 
adherence to their duty of care only for "irrationality," the functional equivalent of a gross 
negligence standard. 1d at 457; see In rc Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 
748 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (''[T]he appropriate standard for 
determining liability is widely believed to be gross negligence, but a single Delaware case has 
held that orditulf)' negligence would be the appropriate standard." (citing Rabkin v. Philip A. 
Hunt Chern. Corp., 1987 WL 28436, at *1-3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1987) (employing an 
ordinary negligence standard) (footnotes omitted))). 
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gross negligence standard of review consistently to duty-of-care cases 
that implicate the Rule.31 
Stephen Bainbridge contends that treating the Rule as a standard 
of review leads to erroneous decisions, and he therefore prefers to 
conceptualize the rule as an abstention doctrine "pursuant to which 
courts in fact refrain from reviewing board decisions unless exacting 
preconditions for review are satisfied."32 Lyman Johnson has similarly 
argued that the Rule is best understood as a "narrow-gauged policy of 
non-review."33 Johnson thus proposes a "modest" Rule as follows: 
'" [W]here money damages or equitable relief is sought, the [Rule] is a 
judicial policy of not reviewing the substantive merits of a board of 
directors' business decision for the purpose of detennining whether 
directors breached or fulfilled their duty of due care."'34 Bainbridge 
and Johnson's reading of the Rule would greatly expand its scope35 
because they would have courts abstain from engaging in substantive 
review of board decisions where the directors can show that they had 
no interest in the challenged transactions, did not conunit waste, and 
followed appropriate decision-making procedures.36 
31. See Aronson v: Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984) ("[D]irector liability is 
predicated on a standard which is less exacting than simple negligence.''). But see Allen et 
al., supra note 23, at 458-61 (decrying recent decisions such as Van Gorkom and Cede & Co. 
v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), as improperly imposing liability on directors 
based on a negligence standard). 
32. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 87. 
33. Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 Bus. LAW. 625, 625 
(2000) (emphasis omitted). 
34. Id at 631. 
35. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 87 (noting that courts adopting the abstention 
approach to the Rule would not review the substance of directors' decisions unless the 
plaintiff can meet the ''very heavy burden of rebutting [the] preswnption" against review). 
Johnson's approach to the Rule is similar. He argues that any breach of the duty to act with 
due care is a breach of fiduciary duty that exposes the director to liability for all damages 
proximately caused by the breach, absent statutory protections against such liability. 
Johnson, supra note 33, at 634 (referencing DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 102{b)(7) (2001), which 
allows corporationS to limit liability for any breach of the duty of care by its directors). 
However, Johnson contends that the Rule precludes a court's substantive review of a board's 
business decisions whether or not the duty of care was violated. Id at 634-35. Like 
Bainbridge, Johnson criticizes the Delaware Supreme Court's decisions in Cede & Co., 634 
A.2d 345, and Cinemma, Inc. ~ Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995), for engaging in 
substantive review of the board's decisions as part of an inquiry into the board's exercise of 
due care. Id at 645-50. 
36. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 128 (contending that courts should review facts 
not to detennine the quality of the decision or whether the board exercised reasonable care 
but whether the decision-making process was tainted by self-dealing, fraud, or illegality). 
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However, courts have conceived the Rule as a form of abstention 
doctrine in a relatively small number of prominent cases.37 When they 
do so, courts justify abstention in tertns of the standard defenses of the 
Rule, explored in Part ll.B. In Shlensky v. Wngley, the court relied on 
the "sovereignty rationale," contending that because directors are 
chosen to make business judgments, their decisions cannot be 
challenged unless tainted by fraud. 38 In refusing to review Henry 
Ford's decision to expand his company's manufacturing facilities in 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., the court noted that ')udges are not business 
experts," another common justification for the Rule.39 Conceiving the 
Rule as an abstention doctrine, rather than as a standard or review or a 
presumption, thus has some support in the case law and also makes 
sense in terms of the standard justifications of the Ru1e, but it is not the 
dominant approach of the courts.40 
Given the doctrinal confusion regarding the nature of the Rule, it 
is not surprising that courts do not apply the Rule consistently. But 
one reason there is no agreement on what standard of review the Rule 
establishes is that the Rule is deployed in too many diverse contexts, 
and it would be inappropriate to apply the same standard of review in 
37. Cf. id at 95-102 (citing Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000), and 
criticizing the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 345, for 
engaging in substantive review of the board's decision-making process to deterntine whether 
it violated its duty of care); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Dodge 
v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 365 (N.Y. 
1888); Kamin v~ Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'~ 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976). 
38. 237 N.E.2d.at 778-80. 
39. 170 N. W. at 684. The same rationale was also deployed when the Kamin court 
stated that "[ t ]he directors' room rather than the courtroom is the appropriate forum for 
thrashing out purely business questions." 383 N. Y.S.2d at 810-11. 
40. The American Law Institute (ALI) takes a complementary approach in its 
Principles of Co1porate Govemance;· Analysis and Recommendations, in which it 
characterizes the Rule as establishing a "safe harbor'' for directors accused of breaching their 
duty of care if they: (1) are disinterested, (2) are reasonably infonned with respect to the 
challenged business judgment, and (3) rationally believe that the judgment is in the best 
interests of the corporation. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS§ 4.0l(c) (1992); see, e.g., Branson, supra note 14, at 636 ("By contrast 
(with the Delaware formulation of the Rule], the ALI version is a safe harbor."); Balotti & 
Hanks, supra note 7, at 1338-39 ("[I]n the ... ALI, there is a [Rule], labelled a 'safe harbor,' 
the satisfaction of which is a complete defense to an alleged breach of the standard of conduct 
.... "). This safe-harbor approach would seem to be equivalent in its effects to the notion of 
the Rule as an abstention doctrine: assuming the board followed the proper decision-making 
procedures and acted in good faith, a court should abstain from review of the substance of 
board decisions. 
. . . 
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all cases.41 This Article takes a closer look at the sorts of decisions that 
are protected by the Rule and provides a general theory that can 
explain when boards should be accorded the Ru1e's protection and 
when the sbareholding public is entitled to hold directors to a standard 
of culpability more in line with their expectations for conduct by 
business decision makers. 
Conceiving the Rule as an abstention doctrine has the advantage 
of providing for a more principled deployment of the Rule, as 
abstention shuts down the litigation at a very early stage and thus 
protects corporations from dissipation of resources and reputational 
harm that could arise in the discovery process. However, this Article 
proposes that such protections are only appropriate when the 
challenged decisions relate to the corporation's prospective business 
plans, the disclosure of which would interfere with the corporation's 
ability to pursue such plans and thus do irreparable harm to the firm 
and its shareholders. 
B Justifications for the Rule 
Courts and legal scholars rely on three kinds of justification for 
the Rule. First, courts defer to the judgment of corporate boards based 
on their superior expertise and knowledge in business matters 
generally and in the affairs of their businesses in particular.42 We trust 
the institutional competence of corporate boards over that of courts 
when it comes to the boards' business decisions.43 In addition, 
concerns regarding judicial economy and the overburdened courts 
speak in favor of keeping challenges to c~rporate boards' decisions out 
of the courts.44 A second justification for the [Rule] is that corporate 
41. See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 437-38 (arguing that courts have applied and 
should apply different standards of review depending on the nature of the alleged breach by 
directors). 
42.. See, e.g., FDIC v. Stahl, 89 F.3d 1510, 1517 (11th Cir. 1996) ("'(D]irectors are, in 
most cases, more qualified to make business decisions than are judges.,.;, (quoting Int 'I Ins. 
Co. v~ Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 n.20 (11th Cir. 1989))); Dodge, 110 N.W at 684 (refusing 
to interfere with Henry Ford's plan to invest Ford's surplus capital in a new manufacturing 
plant on the ground that "judges are not business experts"). 
43. See W. Point-Pepperell, lrtc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In re J.P. Stevens & Co. 
S'holders Litig.), 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988) ('"Because businessmen and women are 
correctly perceived as possessing skills, infonnation and judgment not possessed by 
reviewing courts[,] . . . [the] courts have long been reluctant to second-guess [boards' 
business] decisions when they appear to have been made in good faith."' (quoting Solash v. 
Telex Corp., 1988 WL 3587, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988))). 
44. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 14, at 637-38 f'(A] policy behind the rule is 
conservation of the judicial resource. The [Rule] is a filter that enables courts to easily screen 
out non-meritorious challenges to the actions of directors and executives."). 
• 
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executives would be less inclined to take risks in pursuing aggressive 
strategies that promote economic growth if they could be held 
personally liable every time a court, ruling in hindsight, considered 
those strategies ill-advised.45 
Finally, the Rule is also defended based on a freedom-of-
contract/corporate-democracy theory, according to which shareholders 
agree to delegate decision-making power to corporate boards.46 In the 
interests of protecting the financial resources of the corporation from 
dissipation in litigation, the decisions of a corporate board are subject 
to judicial review only in limited cases involving fraud, self-dealing, or 
decisions so egregious they can only be characterized as waste.47 
45. See; e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that "potential 
profit often corresponds to the potential risk" and recognizing the dangers of hindsight bias). 
Chancellor Allen and his, coauthors break down these first two justification of the Rule as 
follows: 
(I) [D]irectors must often make decisions in an environment of imperfect (that is, 
limited or incomplete) information; (2) the risk of liability under the applicable 
standard of conduct for assuming a given corporate role may dwarf the incentives 
for assuming the role; (3) if the risk of liability is disproportionate to the directors' 
incentives for service, directors may avoid making economically valuable decisions 
that might subject them to litigation risk; (4) courts are ill-equipped to determine 
after the fact whether a particular business decision was reasonable in the 
circumstances confronting the corporation; and (5) institutional and prudential 
considerations sometimes counsel judicial deference to the corporate decision 
maker. 
Allen et al., supra note 23, at 451-52; see Frances T. v. Viii. Green Owners Ass'n, 723 P.2d 
573, 582 n.l4 (Cal. 1986) ("[D]irectors should be given wide latitude in their handling of 
corporate affairs because the hindsight of the judicial process is an imperfect device for 
evaluating business decisions."). 
46. See Allen et al., supra note 23, at 456 ("Directors are elected, and can be removed, 
by shareholders. Where stockholders are able to change the board because of inadequate 
performance, there is less reason for courts to intervene and police whether the directors are 
behaving reasonably."). 
47. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 46 (2004) (noting cases in which actual 
waste is found have been described as akin to the Loch Ness Monster "so rare as to be 
possibly nonexistent"); see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 748 (Del. 
Ch. 2005), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("Corporate waste is very rarely found in Delaware 
courts because the applicable test imposes such an onerous burden upon a plaintiff . ... "); 
Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at • 5 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995) 
("There surely are cases of fraud; of unfair self-dealing and, much more rarely negligence. 
But rarest of all and indeed, like Nessie, possibly non-existent would be the case of 
disinterested business people making non-fraudulent deals (non-negligently) that meet the 
legal standard of waste!"). The Brehm court describes the test for waste as "stringent;' that is, 
"'an exchange that is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could 
conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration."' Brehln v. Eisner; 746 
A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (quoting In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 748). 
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None of these defenses of the Rule is satisfying. The 
justifications are unconvincing because we do not protect similarly 
situated decision makers with similar common law rules of 
deference.48 In addition, the justifications fail to the extent that they 
explain the Rule in terms of the need to protect directors who are 
already sheltered from liability through statutory means.49 But most of 
all, these justifications fail because they focus on the need to protect 
directors rather than on the need to protect the vital interests of the 
corporation against litigation threats that are unlikely to further those 
interests. 
1. Deference to Boards' Business Expertise 
The cases are legion in which courts proclaim the virtues of the 
Rule in allocating responsibility for business decisions to professional 
businessmen rather than to judges whose area of expertise is law. 5° But 
legal scholars have pointed out several weaknesses in this justification 
for the Rule. For one thing, judges are often called upon to rule in 
cases involving factual scenarios that require professional expertise.51 
But courts do not routinely defer to the medical judgment of doctors or 
48. See Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 305, 312-14 (arguing that the decisions made by 
business directors do not deserve any more deference than medical or legal decisions, which 
also require the decision maker to take risks or which might result in a loss). 
49. See infra Part ll.B.2. 
50. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) (supporting the 
Rule on the ground it prevents courts from becoming enmeshed in complex decision-making 
processes that they are ill-equipped to handle); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 
(Mich. 1919) (refusing to question Ford's decision to expand its manufacturing facilities on 
the ground that ')udges are not business experts"); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1968) ("'[I]t is not [the court's] function to resolve for corporations questions of 
policy and business management. The directors are chosen to pass upon such questions and 
their judgment unless shown to be tainted with fraud is accepted as final."' (quoting Davis v. 
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 142 A. 654, 659 (DeL Ch. 1928) (emphasis omitted))). For a 
novel scholarly defense of this rationale, see Manning, supra note 24, at 1491 (contending 
that the linear reasoning characteristic of legal thought is not well suited to business decision 
making). 
51. See Davis, supra note 8, at 581 ("Can anyone seriously argue that surgeons in the 
operating room, lawyers in the midst of a heated trial, or accountants up against a closing 
deadline are not also called upon to make snap judgments in response to circumstances that 
may be difficult to recreate in a courtroom years later? Nonetheless, our legal system is quite 
comfortable relying on the device of litigation to review ... the quality of these professionals' 
performances .... "); Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgnnd s Education: Using 
Dickens and Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) the Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOK. 
L. REv. 799, 825-26 (1997) (characterizing the justification as "disingenuous"); Dale A. 
Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting Cases, 79 IOWA L. 
REv. 485, 572 (1994) (dismissing the rationale as an "old adage"). 
• 
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the engineering expertise of product designers.52 Instead, they rely on 
expert testimony. 53 There is no reason why, aided by expert witnesses, 
courts could not apply the same standard of liability to business 
decision makers as they do to decision makers in other fields requiring 
professional expertise. 
Moreover, as one cotnmentator has noted, "[D]irectors, at least 
the outside directors, bring to the table no particular business expertise 
or experience, but instead general qualities such as common sense, 
integrity, and a track record of accomplishment. These are, not 
surprisingly, the same qualities that characterize most members of the 
judiciary."54 If anything, the expertise of businessmen poses fewer 
challenges for courts than does the expertise of other professionals 
who do not enjoy the special protections accorded by the Rule. 
Indeed, it may be true as a general rule that judges are less 
qualified than professional businessmen to evaluate substantive 
business decisions taken by a corporate board.55 However, there is no 
reason to think that the general rule should be maintained in 
jurisdictions such as Delaware and the New York .state Supreme 
Court's Commercial Division in which the judges have remarkable and 
varied commercial expertise.56 As more states set up conunercial 
52. See Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 288 ("[T]he standards of ordinary negligence 
sufficient to create liability for automobile drivers, doctors, lawyers, and just about anyone 
else except children are not sufficient in an action on behalf of the corporation against its 
directors."). Gevurtz provides a more extended argwnent for why the ordinary negligence 
standard could apply to business decisions just as it does to other decisions made by 
professionals. ld at 305-12. 
53. Davis, supra note 8, at 581; see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 94 (1991) ("The standard justifications ... 
do not explain why the same judges who decide whether engineers have designed the 
compressors on jet engines properly, whether the fanner delivered pomegranates confot ming 
to the industry's specifications, and whether the prison system adversely affects the mental 
states of prisoners cannot decide whether a manager negligently failed to sack a subordinate 
who made improvident loans."); Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. 
the Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REv. 587, 613-17 
( 1994) (highlighting differences between cases in the areas in medical malpractice and 
corporate law). 
54. Davis, supra note 8, at 581 (footnote omitted). 
55. See FDIC v. Stahl, 89 F.3d 1510, 1517 {lith Cir. 1996) (noting that directors are 
usually more qualified than judges to make business decisions). 
56. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indetenninacy in 
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1908, 1925 (1998) (noting the Delaware Court of 
Chancery's experience in corporate adjudication and reputation for proficiency in corporate 
matters); see also ABA Ad Hoc Comm. on Bus. Courts, Business Courts: Towards a More 
Efficient Judiciary, 52 Bus. LAW. 947, 955-56 (1997) (stating that the skilled judges and 
efficiency of Delaware's Court of Chancery are often credited with spawning the push for 
business courts elsewhere); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Tn'vial?: A Political and 
Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 590 (1990) ("Delaware's governor, mindful of the 
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courts presided over by judges with special business expertise, this 
justification of the Rule looks more and more archaic. 57 
Oddly enough, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel defend the 
Rule based on the fact that the discovery process often provides judges 
with more-infortnation about challenged decisions than the directors 
actually had at the time the challenged decisions were made. 58 The 
Rule thus prevents judges with a more complete picture of the 
circumstances from faulting directors for a hastily made d~cision.59 
But the Rule is a rather extreme way to address the_ problem of 
hindsight bias. Indeed, courts already seem well aware of the danger 
of hindsight bias.60 In short, this rationale for the Rule is rather hard to 
defend in the very jurisdictions that have done the most to help 
develop it. 
Finally, this justification for the Rule is especially misplaced 
when boards of directors rely on expert opinions in making their 
business decisions, as they are permitted to do, for example, under 
Delaware law.61 When boards rely on expert opinions, they concede 
value of corporate charters, often deliberately appoints judges with corporate experience.''); 
William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of 
Chmcery 1792-1992, 18 DEL~ J. CORP. L. 819,841-65 (1993) (outlining the Delaware Court 
of Chancery's history and development from 1910 until present day in light of the advent of 
corporate litigation); Larry Smith, All Systems Go: New lfJrk Business Courts Celebmte a 
First Anniversary, INSIDE LITIG., Jan. 1997, at 1, 1-2 (stating that New York's Commercial 
. ' . 
Division is the forum of choice for commercial litigation because of its management and 
judicial expertise, while general court system judges neither enjoy nor understand the issues 
of complex commercial litigation). 
57. See Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History _of the Creation and 
Junsdiction of Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 Bus. LAW. 147~ 151-52 (2004) 
. . . (discussing the potential creation and jurisdiction of business courts in Colorado, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island). 
58. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 53, at 100 (''Judges also are 
accustomed to deciding_ cases on full records and may be too quick to blame managers who 
act as often they should in haste or on incomplete infom1ation."). 
59. Jd 
60. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (DeL Ch. 1998), 
aff'd in part, revtl in part, Brehm v. Eisner, 7 46 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) ("It is the essence of the 
[Rule] that a court will not apply 20/20 hindsight to second guess a board's decision, except 
'in rare cases [where] a transaction may be so egregious_ on its face that board approval 
cannot meet the test of business judgment."' (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 
(Del. 1984)) ). 
61. DEL. CODE., ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (e) (200 1) ("A member of the board of directors ... 
shall . . . be fully protected in relying in good faith upon . . . such information, opinions, 
reports or statements presented to the corporation by ... any other person as to matters the 
member reasonably believes are within such other person's professional or expert competence 
.. . . "); see Brehm v.-Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,-261 (Del. 2000) ("The Old Board [was] entitled to 
the presumption that it exercised proper business judgment, including proper reliance on the 
' . 
expert.'' (footnote omitted)). 
. -
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that they lack expertise relevant to the business judgment in question. 
Once they have had the opportunity to read the relevant experts' 
reports and to hear testimony from qualified witnesses, judges are as 
well-qualified as directors to assess the quality of boards' decisions on 
matters in which those boards relied on expert opinions . 
• 
2. The Need To Protect Entrepreneurial Risk Takers 
The American Law Institute's (ALI) Principles of Corporate 
Governance provides as the main justification of the Rule the need "to 
protect directors and officers from the risks inherent in hindsight 
reviews of their unsuccessful decisions, and to avoid the risk of stifling 
innovation and venturesome business activity.',62 Numerous courts 
have similarly recognized the need to shield directors from liability for 
the risky ventures necessary for commercial development.63 Scholars 
and courts have expressed concern that qualified businesspeople 
would refuse to serve on boards if their risky decisions were not 
62. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 
supra note 40, § 4.01 cmt. d. Whether the Rule protects both officers and directors or only 
directors is hotly contested among scholars and in the courts today. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, 
Co1porate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 Bus. LAW. 439, 440 (2005) ("[The 
Rule]. does not and should not be extended to corporate officers in the same broad manner in 
which it is applied to directors."). The issue is at the heart of plaintiffs' efforts to hold certain 
Disney directors liable as officers when they acted in their capacities as corporate officers of 
Disney in connection with the Ovitz litigation. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 36, In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (No. 411, 2005), 2005 WL 
2777912 ("[T]he [Rule] does not apply to Eisner or Litvack acting as officers or to Russell 
acting as Eisner's personal 'gratuitous agent."'); Answering Brief of Non-Ovitz Defendants-
Below, Appellees at 55, In re Disney, 906 A.2d 27 (No. 411, 2005), 2005 WL 3452042 
(arguing that both numerous dicta and strong policy considerations suggest that the Rule 
should apply to both officers and directors). The Delaware Supreme Court refused to address 
the issue in the Disney litigation, finding that it was procedurally barred. In re Disney, 906 
A.2d at 46 n.38. 
63. See, e.g., 1 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 12-13 (citing cases); Joy v. North, 692 
E2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[B]ecause potential profit often corresponds to the potential 
risk, it is very much in the interest of shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly 
cautious corporate decisions."); Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. 
Ch. 1996) ("Shareholders don't want (or shouldn't rationally want) directors to be risk averse. 
Shareholders' investment interests ... will be maximized if corporate directors and managers 
honestly assess risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted 
returns available that are above the fmn 's cost of capital."); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 ("Should the Court apportion 
liability based on the ultimate outcome of decisions taken in good faith by faithful directors 
or officers, those decision-makers would necessarily take decisions that minimize risk, not 
maximize value."); see also Allen et al., supra note 23, at 449 ("[D]eference [to business 
decisions] furthers important public policy values and underscores the social utility of 
encouraging corporate directors to make decisions that may create corporate wealth but that 
are also risky."). 
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protected by the Rule.64 Or, even if they agreed to serve on boards, 
they would become risk averse and investors would suffer.65 
However, empirical evidence to support this concern is lacking. 
While corporate directors recently have had to dig into their own 
pockets to pay da111ages in connection with the spectacular collapses of 
Enron and WorldCom,66 those cases involved criminal wrongdoing and 
64. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 717 F. Supp. 575, 582 (N.D. Ill. 
1989), aff'd, 897 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The [Rule] encourages competent individuals to 
become directors who otherwise might decline for fear of personal liability."); Allen et al., 
supra note 23, at 449 ("Highly qualified directors may also avoid service if they face liability 
risks that are disproportionate to the benefits of service."); Davis, supra note 8, at 57 4 ("Why 
would directors enter into [risky business] ventures if they might be called upon to Wlderwrite 
some of the losses arising from unfortunate outcomes while the profits from fortunate 
outcomes flow to the shareholders?"); Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 437-38 ("Perhaps standards 
of conduct and standards of review in corporate law would always be identical in a world in 
which information was perfect, the risk of liability for assuming a given corporate role was 
always commensurate with the incentives for asswning the role, and institutional 
considerations never required deference to a corporate organ. In the real world, however, 
these conditions seldom hold .... "). 
65. Chancellor Allen articulated this concern most colorfully: 
Corporate directors of public companies typically have a very small 
proportionate ownership interest in their corporations and little or no incentive 
compensation. Thus, they enjoy (as residual owners) only a very small proportion 
of any ''upside" gains earned by the corporation on risky investment projects. If, 
however, corporate directors were to be found liable for a corporate loss from a 
risky project on the ground that the investment was too risky (foolishly risky! 
stupidly risky! egregiously risky! you supply the adverb), their liability would be 
joint and several for the whole loss (with I suppose a right of contribution). Given 
the scale of operation of modern public corporations, this stupefying disjunction 
between risk and reward for corporate directors threatens undesirable effects. 
Given this disjunction, only a very small probability of director liability based on 
"negligence", "inattention", "waste", etc., could induce a board to avoid 
authorizing risky investment projects to any extent! Obviously, it is in the 
shareholders' economic interest to offer sufficient protection to directors from 
liability for negligence, etc., to allow directors to conclude that, as a practical 
matter, there is no risk that, if they act in good faith and meet minimal 
proceduralist standards of attention, they can face liability as a result of a business 
loss. 
Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052. 
66. See, e.g., Stephanie Armour, Enron Woes Reverberate Through Lives: Many Saw 
Retirement Plans Evaporate with Stock Pnce, USA TODAY (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 26, 2006, at 
1 B (noting the $85 million settlement with certain Enron officers, directors, and 
administrative committee members); G. Jeffrey MacDonald, Now, Execs Pay for Firms Sins, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Boston), Jan. 31, 2005, at 14 (noting the former WorldCom Inc. 
directors personally agreed to pay $18 million as part of a $54 million settlement with 
shareholders and ten former Enron directors agreed to pay $13 million of their own money as 
part of a $168 million settlement with shareholders); Gretchen Morgenson, Sticky Scandals, 
Teflon Directors, N.Y. TlMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 3, at 1 (''A year ago, 10 Enron directors, 
including eight outside directors, agreed to pay $13 million out of their own pockets to 
shareholders without admitting or denying any liability."). 
846 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:829 
are hardly representative.67 Awards against negligent directors (as 
opposed to directors who are wholly inattentive or engaged in 
interested transactions in breach of their duty of loyalty and who thus 
would not be entitled to the Rule's protections) are actually 
exceedingly rare.68 
It may be that the Rule is the proper mechanism for preventing 
such awards and that it is necessary to encourage desirable risk-taking 
activities by corporate managers.69 However, it is not clear that 
anything more than a negligence standard is needed to protect 
entrepreneurial risk taking. As Franklin Gevurtz has pointed out: 
Spinning off from Judge Hand's famous formula, if the magnitude of 
gain expected from a board decision, multiplied by the probability 
measured ex ante of achieving the gain, exceeds the magnitude of loss 
risked by the decision, multiplied by the probability of the loss, than the 
decision presumably is reasonable. Accordingly, a negligence standard 
should neither deter the taking of desirable risks nor punish simply bad 
results.70 
If the aim is promoting reasonable risk taking, a simple negligence 
standard should suffice. Indeed, a more lenient standard creates a 
moral hazard, as directors can engage in high-risk ventures with 
shareholders' funds and without adequate risk of personal liability. 
Moreover, legislators have created and/or pennitted numerous 
alternative means of protecting directors from liability for their 
business decisions. For example, after the Delaware Supreme Court's 
67. See, e.g., Mary Flood, Opposing Enron Legal Teams on Parallel Paths: Defense 
We1ghs Open-Ended Mandate and Scope ofTask Force, Finds It Wanting, HOUSTON CHRON., 
Dec. 19, 2004, at Dl (noting Enron's fonner chief executive officer, Jeff Skilling, and ex-
Chainrian, Ken Lay, were indicted on multiple fraud and conspiracy charges); Leon Lazaroff, 
Ex-JYco Chief, Top Lieutenant Found Gw1ty, Cm. TruB., June 18,2005, at 1 (mentioning the 
conviction of Bernard J. Ebbers, fonner chainnan of WorldCom Inc., on charges of 
engineering an $11 billion fraud); Phyllis Messinger et al., 10 Enron Players: Mlere They 
LandedARer the Fall, N.Y. TlMES, Jan. 29,2006, § 3, at 8 (summarizing legal resolutions and 
post-Enron careers of ten leading figures in the Enron scandal). 
68. Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 313. 
69. As Chancellor Chandler recently put it: 
Should the Court apportion liability based on the ultimate outcome of decisions 
taken in good faith by faithful directors or officers, those decision-makers would 
necessarily take decisions that minimize risk, not maximize value. The entire 
advantage of the risk-taking, innovative, wealth-creating engine that is the 
Delaware corporation would cease to exist, with disastrous results for shareholders 
and society alike. 
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 
27 (Del. 2006). 
70. Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 305-06 (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 
F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 194 7) (footnotes omitted)). 
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decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom,7' Delaware amended its 
Corporations Law to permit corporations to stipulate in their bylaws 
that directors will not be liable for damages for breach of the duty of 
care.
72 According to the Delaware Supreme Court, 
[t]he purpose of [the amendment] was to pennit shareholders who are 
entitled to rely upon directors to discharge their fiduciary duties at all 
times to adopt a provision in the certificate of incorporation to 
exculpate directors from any personal liability for the payment of 
monetary damages for breaches of their duty of care, but not for duty of 
loyalty violations, good faith violations and certain other conduct.73 
Other states passed similar statutes,74 most of which provide 
exculpation even in cases of gross negligence.75 Some states have 
passed statutes permitting directors to consider the concerns of 
constituencies other than shareholders but not shielding directors from 
liability for breaches of the duty of care.76 
71. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) {2001); see, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 
787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (noting that section 102(b)(7) was passed following the Van 
Gorkom decision). 
73. Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90 (emphasis omitted); see Prod. Res. Group, 
L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 777 (Del. Ch. 2004) ("One of the primary 
purposes of § l02(b )(7) is to encourage directors to undertake risky, but potentially value-
...... ~"'o....J· L.I..I...I..L... ing, business strategies, so long as they do so in good faith."). 
74. Arkes & Schipani, supra note 53, at 617 ("Forty-six jurisdictions have enacted 
legislation which pennits corporations to relieve directors from personal monetary liability to 
the corporation and its shareholders for breach of the fiduciary duty of care."); see, e.g., CAL. 
CoRP. CODE § 204(aXIO) (West 1990) (permitting provisions in a corporation's articles of 
incorporation eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director for monetary damages 
in an action brought by or in the name of the corporation for breach of a director's duties to 
the corporation and its shareholders, except for acts or omissions in breach of the duty of 
loyalty, in bad faith, or constituting intentional misconduct); 805 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/2.10(b)(3) (West 2004) (allowing for a provision in a corporation's articles of incorporation 
that eliminates or limits the personal liability of directors to the corporation or its 
shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director except for any 
breach of the director's duty of loyalty, for acts or omissions not in good faith or that involve 
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, or for participating in interested 
transactions); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 402(b) (McKinney 2003) (pennitting certificates of 
incorporation to eliminate or limit personal liability for directors to the corporation or its 
shareholders for breaches of duty unless the breach is a product of bad faith, intentional 
misconduct, knowing violation of the law, or self-interested conduct). 
75. Arkes & Schipani, supra note 53, at 617; sec, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-l-35-
l{e)(2) (LexisNexis 1999) (stating that a director is not liable for any action taken as a 
director, or any failure to take action, unless "[t]he breach or failure to perfonn constitutes 
willful misconduct or recklessness"); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (2006) (limiting directors 
liability for money damages except in cases of willful misconduct or knowing violations of 
law). 
76. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West 2004) (pennitting the 
corporation's board to consider other stakeholders); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:6-1(2) (West 2003) 
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Similarly, Delaware law permits corporations to indemnify their 
officers and directors, as well as other employees and agents, against 
liability in civil or criminal actions.77 Indemnification is mandatory 
under Delaware law where the officer or director incurs costs in 
connection with legal actions in which the officer or director "has been 
successful on the merits or otheiWise."78 Such indemnification is 
mandated even if the corporation pays tv settle a suit that results from 
the officer's or director's bad faith misconduct.79 Some states permit 
very broad indemnification, even if the result is that a corporation has 
to pay damages to itself on behalf of a director in the context of 
shareholder derivative litigation.8° Finally, on top of protection from 
liability and indemnification, corporations may pay to insure their 
officers and directors against any liability that is beyond the scope of 
statutorily created powers of indemnification or protection from 
liability.81 Such insurance can be quite broad and will be upheld as 
long as it is not contrary to public policy.82 
(same); Omo RE~ CODE ANN.§ 1701.59(E) (LexisNexis 2004) (same); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN.§ 1715(a)(l) (West 1995) (same). 
77. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)-(b). 
78_. Id tit. 8, § 145(c). 
79. See Waltuch v. Conti commodity Servs., Inc., 88 F. 3d 87, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(requiring indemnification under § 145(c) for litigation costs incurred by Waltuch in a suit 
that the company settled by paying $35 million to investors who alleged that Waltuch had 
engaged in fraud, market manipulation, and antitrust violations). 
80. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 722(c) (McKinney 2003). Section 722(c) provides: 
A corporation may indemnify any person made, or threatened to be made, a 
party to an action by or in the right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its 
favor by reason of the fact that he, his testator or intestate, is or was a director or 
officer of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a 
director or officer of any other corporation .... 
See also IND. CODE. ANN.§ 23-1-37-S(a) ("A corporation may indemnify an individual made 
a party to a proceeding because the individual is or was a director against, liability il).c~ed in 
the proceeding ... ~"). "[A ]uthorization of indemnification for 'liabilities incurred in a 
proceeding' is broader than the comparable GCA provision, which permitted indemnification 
for 'expenses' only." Id § 23-1-3 7-8 cmt. a. 
81. See DEL,. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g). 
82. See 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 1985-87 (noting that most directors and 
officers' insurance policies will not cover willful or felonious conduct and that at least one 
court has found that insurance against reckless conduct violates public policy); EASTERBROOK 
& FISCHEL, supra note 53, at 105 (defending insurance and indemnification schemes as 
allowing firms to contract around liability rules when markets are cheaper than courts and 
noting that these schemes are enforced "almost without exception"); Roberta Romano, The 
Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 55, 57 (1991) 
("Policies routinely exempt losses from adjudication of dishonesty, but if a claim is settled, 
courts prohibit insurers from seeking an adjudication of guilt and thereby avoiding the claim's 
payment. Similarly, while all policies exclude losses involving personal profit, if a suit 
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In addition, state legislatures have adopted procedural rules to 
deter suits against corporate directors.83 The statutes, modeled on the 
Revised Model Business Co1poration Act; require that a plaintiff post 
security for the corporation's expenses atld attorneys' fees to be 
incurred in coiUlection with the suit, unless the plaintiff is a significant 
shareholder (usually holding over 5% of outstanding shares or $25,000 
worth of the defendant corporation's stock).84 Such a security is not 
req11ired either in Delaware or under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.85 A number of explanations are offered for Delaware's 
refusal to pass such statutes: they discourage meritorious suits; they 
discriminate against minority shareholders; they are easily 
circumvented; and they are not necessary to protect corpomtions from 
meritless suits, especially-as other means are available.86 The fact that 
fourteen jurisdictions have nonetheless passed legislation granting 
corporations these additional protections suggests the len · to ·which 
legislatures have gone to protect directors from potentialliability.87 
All of this legislation arose long after the Rule was already in 
place.88 In short, if the Rule is intended to protect corporate decision 
alleging breach of both the duty of care and loyalty is settled, the insurer is required to cover 
e entrre c aun . . . . . th . I . ~') 
83. See, e.g., Shiro Kawashima & Susumu Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation 
in Japan: Law, Practice, and Suggested Refo1n1S, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 9, 44 ( 1997) (noting at 
least fourteen states allow corporations to require plaintiffs to post security for expenses in 
derivative suits); see also DEBORAH A. DEMOIT, SHAREHOLDER DERJVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW 
AND PRAcncE § 3.1 (2006) (stating sixteen states that require the posting of a bond). 
84. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-714(c)(4) (2001) ("[T]he court shall fiX the nature 
and amount of security to be furnished by the plaintiff for reasonable expenses, including 
attorneys, fees, which may be incurred by the moving party and the corporation in connection 
with such action, including, but without limiting, the foregoing expenses for which the 
corporation may become liable pursuant to § 4-26-814."); CAL. CoRP. CODE § 800(c)(l)-
(2)( d) (West 1990) (indicating that a corporation or defendant may seek a bond up to $50,000 
in a shareholder derivative suit- if ( 1) there is no reasonable possibility that the prosecution of 
the cause will benefit the corporation or its shareholders, or (2) the moving party~ if not the 
corporation, did not participate in the complained of transaction); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 
(McKinney 2003) (stating a corporation can require shareholders bringing a derivative suit to 
give security if their holdings are less than 5% of the outstanding shares and are valued ~t less 
than $50,000). 
85. Kawashima & Sakurai, supra note 83, at 44. 
86. Jd at 4445. Kawashima and Sakurai suggest that sanctioning attorneys who 
bring meritless suits is a better means of deterring strike suits. Jd at 45 n.312. This seems 
unlikely, however, as moving for attorney sanctions merely adds a new layer of litigation to 
the corporation's burden. 
87. Jd at 44. 
88. See l BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 9-11 (tracing the history of the Rule, noting 
its inception in England in 1742 and its development within American jurisprudence 
beginning in 1829); Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 287 ("[T]he rule, in one fonn or another, 
extends back through 160 years of judicial decisions."). 
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makers from the kind of exposure to liability that might make them 
risk averse, they seem to be more than adequately protected, even 
absent the Rule. If the Rule was once necessary to protect directors 
from liability for violations of their duty of care, statutory 
developments have rendered that aim obsolete. 
3. The Sovereignty Rationale 
In this Subpart, I will discuss two different versions of what 
Davis has tenned the "sovereignty rationale" for the Rule.89 The 
weaker, but more generally accepted, formulation of the sovereignty 
rationale acknowledges that corporations ought to be run in the 
interests of shareholders, but argues that because directors are elected 
by shareholders, the shareholders should hold them accountable 
through the mechanisms of corporate democracy rather than through 
litigation.90 "Where stockholders are able to change the board because 
of inadequate performance, there is less reason for courts to intervene 
and police whether the directors are behaving reasonably."91 This 
would be persuasive if the mechanisms for corporate accountability 
made corporate executives somewhat responsive to shareholder 
concerns. For the reasons given below, they do not, and thus the weak 
version of the sovereignty rationale is unconvincing.92 
The stronger version of the sovereignty rationale is the doctrine 
of director primacy, which rejects the notion that shareholders have the 
right to control the corporations they own.93 CoWltering both the 
89. Davis, supra note 8, at 587 (citing DEL. CooEANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (directives that 
the corporation's affairs be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors)). 
90. See 1 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 17 ("[T]he [Rule] ensures that directors 
rather than shareholders manage corporations."); Brown & Regner, supra note 6, at 2 
("Courts are mindful that shareholders have elected the directors, not the courts, to supervise 
the affairs of the corporations they own."). 
91. Allen et al., supra note 23, at 456; see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 
A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005), atrd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("The redress for failures that 
arise from faithful management must come from the markets, through the action of 
shareholders and the free flow of capital, and not from this Court."); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 
F. 614, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) ("Must a director guarantee that his judgment is good? Can 
shareholders call him to account for deficiencies which their votes assured him did not 
disqualify him for his office? While he may not have been the Cromwell for that Civil War, 
Andrews did not engage to play any such role."). 
92. See infm Part II.B.3.a. 
93. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547,550-51 (2003) ("Shareholders do not own the 
corporation and, accordingly, directors are not stewards of shareholder wealth. Shareholders 
are simply a group of participants bound together by a web of voluntary agreements whose 
nexus the law treats as a finn.''). Bainbridge notes, however, that though shareholders do not 
control corporations, they are the beneficiaries of the board's fiduciary duties under the 
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shareholder-primacy doctrine and managerialism,94 the director-
primacy doctrine contends that "[n]either shareholders nor managers 
control corporations boards of directors do."95 The director-primacy 
doctrine sides with shareholders as opposed to other ''stakeholders'' in 
the corporation as it "embraces the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm even as it rejects the theory of shareholder primacy."96 However, 
the director-primacy doctrine rejects the notion that directors exercise 
powers over corporate matters only as agents of the shareholders.97 
a. The Weak Sovereignty Rationale: Corporate Democracy 
The only way to justify permitting directors to make business 
decisions with shareholders' capital is if the shareholders have agreed 
to place responsibility for such decisions in the hands of management 
On first glance, it seems obvious that they have done so, either based 
on a theory of corporate democracy or based on simple contract law. 
Either shareholders have consented to the delegation of decision-
making authority to the board through elections of the board's 
members or, by purchasing shares in a corporation, they have 
director-primacy doctrine. Id at 550; see Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate 
Gove.mance, 47 Bus. LAW. 461, 462-63 (1992) (criticizing the ALI Governance Project for 
adopting a "responsibility moder' rather than the "authority model'' of corporate governance 
. . 
which Dooley believes to be 4 'the prevailing judicial and statutory precedent"). 
94. Managerialism has its origins in the classic work of ADoLF A. BERLE & 
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 217 (4th rev. ed. 
1968). For a concise review of the managerialist approach, see Alfred F. Conard, Beyond 
Managenalism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 117, 120-30 (1988). 
Bebchuk and Fried concisely s · e the central doctrines of the managerialist school as 
follows: 
The dispersed owners of a typical publicly traded company cannot monitor 
or direct managers' actions, so the executives who exert day-to-day control in such 
companies often have considerable discretion. In such a situation, ownership and 
control are separated. Shareholders own the company, but the managers exercise a 
substantial amount of control over how it is run. 
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at 15. In the managerialist account, shareholders are 
dispersed and hold diversified portfolios; accordingly, they are relatively apathetic with 
respect to the management of the corporations they own. This apathy permits managers and 
inside directors to exercise effective control over the corporation. Lynne L. Dallas, The New 
Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1363, 1370-
71 (2002). 
95. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 550. 
96. Id at 551. 
97. Id at 548 n.8 (citing with disapproval Chancellor Allen's view in Blasius 
Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988), that ''[t]he theory of out 
corporation law confers power upon directors as the agents of the shareholders; it does not 
create Platonic masters"). 
• 
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presumably consented to the corporate governing structure, which 
delegates decision-making authority to the board.98 
Three considerations might make us question whether theories of 
corporate democracy and freedom of contract really justify the 
protections afforded to corporate decision makers under the Rule. 
First, it is usually the case that common shareholders have no real 
voice in choosing the people who make decisions on behalf of a public 
corporation.99 Outside of the context of hostile takeovers, electoral 
challenges to incwnbent board members are "practically nonexistent,'' 
averaging about two per year between 1996 and 2002 in corporations 
with market capitalization in excess of $200 million. 100 
Second, even if we were convinced that common shareholders 
had actual power to elect boards, boards and executives deprive 
shareholders of information to which they are entitled and which they 
could use to protect their interests as shareholders. 101 At times, it is 
perfectly appropriate for a board to make decisions without informing 
shareholders. Much of what boards do is confidential and could not be 
openly discussed without doing irreparable harm to the corporation 
(and thus to shareholders) by disclosing prospective business plans and 
strategy. 102 However, as we shall see in the context of executive 
98. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746 (DeL Ch. 2005), 
aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("The [Rule] serves to protect and promote the role of the 
board as the ultimate manager of the corporation."). 
99. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 Bus. 
LAW. 43, 45 (2003) ("Although shareholder power to replace directors is supposed to be an 
important element of our corporate governance system, it is largely a myth."). 
100. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at 25; Bebchuk, supra note 99, at 46. 
101. See discussion intra notes 216-219 and accompanying text regarding camouflage 
of executive compensation. 
102. See Tender Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6158, Exchange Act Release No. 
16,384, Investment Company Act Release No. 10,958, 44 Fed. Reg~ 70,326, 70,335-36 (Nov. 
29, 1979) (considering secrecy in the context of a Schedule 140-9 filing and illustrating the 
SEC's attempts to accommodate business demands for secrecy); see also Schedule 140-9, 17 
C.F.R. 240.14d-1 01 (2006); 17 C.F.R. 229 .I 006 Instruction to Item 1 006( d)( 1) (2006) ("If an 
agreement in principle has not been reached at the time of filing, no disclosure ... is required 
of the possible terms of or the parties to the transaction if in the opinion of the board of 
directors of the subject company disclosure would jeopardize continuation of the 
negotiations."); Hockett v. Sun Co., 109 F.3d 1515, 1523 (lOth Cir. 1997) (finding in the 
context of ERISA that requiring employers reveal their internal deliberations could hinder the 
achievement of "'business goals' by allowing competitors to know that the employer is 
considering a labor reduction, . . . a merger, or some other. strategic move"); Staffin v. 
Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206 (3d Cir. 1982) (fmding merit in the opinions of other courts 
and conunentators that in the area of takeover bids, disclosure of such discussions may do 
more hann to the corporation than secrecy itself); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L~ 
REv. 1059, 1091 (1990) (arguing corporate infonnation should not be disclosed if, in.the 
directors' judgment, the disclosure would jeopardize the value of the firm's shares in the 
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compensation schemes, boards also deprive shareholders of 
inforntation to which they are entitled when disclosure of the 
information poses no risk of harm to the interests of the corporation 
other than the reputational or outrage harm that would attach to 
disclosure of excessive executive compensation. Where there is no 
need to protect the confidentiality of decision-making processes, there 
is no reason why directors should not answer to the shareholders in 
whose interests they are supposed to act. 
Finally, even if we believe that shareholders freely elect corporate 
directors, those directors have fiduciary duties to protect the interests 
of both the corporation and the shareholders. 103 Thus, it hardly seems 
appropriate to shield the fiduciaries from liability for negligent 
. . 
conduct in connection with the execution of their fiduciary duties 
when we do not similarly shield other professionals in whom 
individuals place their trust and confidence.104 
Even if we view the relationship between shareholders and 
directors as a voluntary one in which shareholders have delegated 
certain decision-making powers to the directors, it is not clear why the 
directors should not be held to an ordinary negligence standard. The 
decision to invest in a corporation can be analogized to the process of 
choosing to enter into a relationship with a provider of professional 
services, such as a doctor, a lawyer, an architect, or a mechanic.105 The 
fact that one enters the relationship deliberately does not protect the 
professional from liability if she perfonns her professional tasks 
negligently.106 
aggregate); Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure 
Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: '.!4re Ute There let?, ,, 20 CARDozo L. REv. 
135, 136 & n.l (1998) (stating that managers are willing to disclose large amounts of 
information to appease investors, but managers prefer not to disclo.se "( s ]orne information 
[that] is too valuable to reveal to one's competitors" because "[i]nfonnation about strategy 
and business segments can help competitors if too much detail is offered, hurting 
shareholders in the process"). 
103. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (''The shareholder constituents 
of a Delaware corporation are entitled to rely upon their elected directors to discharge their 
fiduciary duties at all times."); Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 729 
(Del. 1988) ("The exercise of this managerial power is tempered by fundamental fiduciary 
obligations owed by the directors to the corporation and its shareholders."); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 
5 A.2d ~03, 510 (Del. 1939) ("[Directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and 
its stockholders."). 
104. See Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 315. 
105. Id 
106. See id ("The fact that shareholders have entered into a voluntary relationship 
with the directors is not different from most situations involving malpractice claims. The 
same is generally true of patients with doctors, clients with attorneys, and a host of other 
situations out of which negligence actions may arise."). 
. . 
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Easterbrook and Fischel offer what might be considered a 
corollary to this weak sovereignty approach, placing their faith in the 
efficiency of capital markets.107 Shareholders who are dissatisfied with 
the stewardship of a corporation will simply take their money 
elsewhere, and they are also able to diversify their risk by investing in 
nt1merous firms across capital markets.108 This model suggests that 
corporations served by poor managers will underperform. Investors, if 
they are paying attention, will move on, and the managers will be 
replaced with better ones when the corporation's fortunes suffer 
accordingly. But markets do not always work this way, and, even if 
they did, this rationale does little to explain why the Rule should 
prevent an investor who was hartned by a board's negligence from 
seeking legal redress for that wrong. When investors discover the 
breach, they may well choose to move their capital elsewhere but by 
the time they do so, they already may have suffered significant losses. 
b. The Strong Sovereignty Rationale: Director Primacy 
The director-primacy model is a significant conceptual 
contribution to our understanding of the way corporations both do and 
should operate. Director primacy provides the most sophisticated 
account of why the Rule is necessary to protect directors from liability 
for their business decisions. For that reason, it is worthwhile to 
explore the theory of director primacy in some detail. This Article 
concludes that though the theory that directors, not shareholders, are 
the center of decision-making power within the corporation is 
generally correct, there are still circ11mstances in which the board must 
answer to the corporation's shareholders. In such circut11stances, the 
Rule should not impede the realization of the goal of shareholder 
wealth maximization. 
As a descriptive model, director primacy has certain advantages 
over the dominant shareholder-primacy model. 109 As a normative 
model, directory primacy has certain advantages over managerial 
approaches to the corporation.110 If we adopt the director-primacy 
model, we would expect to favor a robust Rule that safeguards the 
107. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 53, at 96 (''Managers must perform 
well to keep share prices high; if they do not, they can expect to be replaced."). 
108. Id at 99; see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 
2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("The redress for failures that arise from faithful 
management must come from the markets, through the action of shareholders and the free 
flow of capital, and not from this Court."). 
109. See infra notes 113-128 and accompanying text. 
110. See in/Tanotes 129-145 and accompanying text. 
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authority of boards to make the decisions that corporate structures 
have placed in their hands.1l 1 
The argument for director primacy derives_ from a contractarian 
view of the corporation that attempts to avoid reification of the 
corporation by viewing it as a nexus of contracts.112 According to the 
director-primacy model, there must be some decision-making power 
that permits action by a nonreified corporation,113 and the center of that 
action is the board of directors. 114 "The board of directors thus can be 
seen as a sort of Platonic guardian a sw· generis body serving as the 
nexus for the various contracts making up the corporation and whose 
powers flow not from shareholders alone, but from the complete set of 
contracts constituting the firm."115 This view of the corporation seems 
to find some statutory support in section 141(a) of Delaware's General 
Corporation Law and the Van Gorkom decision: 
"Under Delaware law, the [Rule] is the offspring of the fundamental 
principle, codified in [Delaware General Corporation Law] § 14l(a), 
that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by 
or under its board of directors. . . . The [Rule] exists to protect and 
promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to 
D 1 A:- ,116 e aware Wlectors. 
Shareholders, by contrast, "have no power to initiate corporate action," 
as the statutory structtrre "is one in which the board acts and the 
shareholders, at most, react."117 In addition, in response to arguments 
that executives, not directors, control corporations, the director-
Ill. See Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 603 (''The [Rule] prevents such a shift in the 
locU$ of decisiorunaking authority from boards to judges by establishing a limited system for 
case-by-casejudicial oversight in which review of the substantive merits of those decisions is 
avoided.''). 
112. Id at 552-53; see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Book Review Essay, Executive 
Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1615, 1646 (2005) (reviewing BEBCHUK & 
FRIED, supra note 4 7) (''[S]hareholders have no natural or inherent rights of ownership or 
control. Instead, they have only those rights for which they bargained. And those rights are 
extremely limited.'' (footnote omitted)). 
113. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 555.. I do not share the contractarians' concerns 
regarding reification. Once we recognize that certain business associations are to be treated 
as legal persons, we transform such entities into· subjects for both legal and real-world 
purposes. The reification has occurred; and I see no advantage in a legal theory that pretends 
otherwise. 
114. ld at 559. 
115. Id at 560. 
116. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 109 (quoting Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 
872 (Del. 1985)); see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746 (DeL Ch. 
2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("The [Rule] serves to protect and promote the role of 
the board as the ultimate manager of the corporation."). 
117. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 559. 
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primacy model contends that "[i]n situations of overt conflict between 
• 
the board and top management, the board's authority prevails as a 
matter of law, if not always in practice."118 
This quotation provides two key openings for criticism of the 
director-primacy approach. First, as we shall discuss in further detail 
in the context of executive compensation, situations of conflict 
between boards of directors and top management are exceedingly 
rare not because managers are beholden to the board, but because 
managers dominate the board. 119 Second, in rare cases of conflict 
between a board and managers, while the board's authority should 
always prevail as a matter of Jaw, if it does prevail as a matter of fact, it 
does so only in response to shareholder derivative suits or other outside 
pressures that call attention to breaches of duties owed by executives. 120 
118. ld at 563. 
119. See discussion in/Ta Part III.B.3. There is extensive literature on the phenomenon 
known as "board capture." See~ e.g., Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the 
Management-Captured Board-The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REv. 127, 
134 ( 1996) (suggesting that equity compensation of board members will transfonn them into 
owner-directors and reduce the possibility of board passivity); Charles M. Elson, The Duty of 
Care, Compensation~ and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 649, 709 (1995) ("The most 
critical problem confronting United States corporation law today is ... the flourishing of the 
passive board created by management capture."). 
120. Some recent examples: Radio Shack's CEO, David Edmondson, resigned .in a 
"mutual decision" with the board after revelations that he had fabricated credentials on his 
resume. Floyd Norris, RadioShack Chief Resigns After Lying, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at 
C I [hereinafter Norris, RadioShack Chief Resigns]. RadioS hack agreed to pay the departing 
executive a severance package of $975,000. Floyd Norris, Fo1mer RadioShack Chief May 
Gain /Tom Options, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at C3 [hereinafter Norris, Fo1111er RadioShack 
Chief May Gain From Options]. Clearly all the negative publicity relating to this revelation 
was crucial, because the board was not moved to act by the fact that "RadioShack's stock 
perfonned poorly in the time after Mr. Edmondson became president," although the move 
might have been motivated by the twelve percent decline in the stock during the week when 
Mr. Edmondson's fabricated credentials were disclosed. Norris, RadioShack Chief Resigns, 
at C 1. Analog Devices recently disclosed that it paid its CEO, Jerald Fishman, $144.7 million 
in deferred compensation. Gretchen Morgenson, A ~Holy Cow' Moment in Pay/and, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, § 3, at I. Although such disclosures would be required under new 
proposed SEC rules, a company spokeswoman explained that Analog Devises "wanted to be 
completely transparent to its shareholders." Id A commendable sentiment but apparently not 
consistent with the company's past practices; it is in the midst of settling with the SEC to end 
the investigation into allegations the company improperly timed its options' grants to officers 
and directors so the options would be granted just prior to the release of favorable financial 
reports. ld Analog Devises is reported to have agreed to pay a $3 million penalty, while Mr. 
Fishman will pay $1 million plus a disgorgement penalty of undisclosed magnitude. Id The 
company neither admits nor denies any wrongdoing. ld Apparently, the company's desire to 
be "completely transparent to its shareholders" has its limits. ld; see Rakesh Khurana & 
Katharina Pick, The Social Nature of Boards, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 1259, 1273 (2005) ('~ 
popular criticism leveled by legislators and scholars against boards involved in recent 
corporate scandals is that they did not have the cowage or the conviction to challenge senior 
management and/or the CEO on important issues."). 
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The theory of director primacy purports to be both nortnatively 
and descriptively more accurate than the shareholder-primacy model. 121 
The model is descriptively superior, Bainbridge contends, because 
most of the time boards make decisions that are not subject to 
shareholder review: "In general, shareholders of public corporations 
have neither the legal right, the practical ability, nor the desire to 
. . 
exercise the kind of control necessary for meaningful monitoring of 
the corporation's agents."122 The model is nonnatively superior 
because director primacy permits the corporation to achieve its most 
important goal: shareholder wealth m . · · . tion. 123 
As a normative matter, given all the clear conflicts of interest 
brought to light by recent corporate governance scandals, 124 
Bainbridge's claim that boards can protect shareholder interests and 
uphold the nonn of shareholder wealth m · · ation is undercut by 
his concession that "a substantial number of directors feel a 
responsibility towards stakeholders" and thus will not always decide in 
favor of shareholder wealth m . · · ation.125. One area that scholars 
have identified where the interests of shareholders and the interests of 
directors diverge is in long-term versus short-term rises in stock 
priceS.126 The real conflict of interest here is actually between 
121. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 563-74; see Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 86 ("I have 
argued elsewhere that shareholder primacy is neither not matively persuasive nor descriptively 
accurate."). But see Wayne 0. Hanewicz, Director Primacy, Onmicare, and the FunctiQn of 
Corporate Law, 71 TENN. L. REv. 511, 514-15 (2004) (identifying both descriptive and 
normative weakness in the director-primacy model). 
122. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 568. 
123~ Id at 551-52. 
124. See Rachel Beck, Corporate Takeovers Can Bring Executives Big Takeaways, ST. 
LoUis POST•DISPATCH, June 5, 2005, at E7 ('"Executives keep finding way[s] to reward 
themselves, even when shareholders or their workers might not be getting the best deal 
.... "'); Claudia H. Deutsch, Take lfJur Best Shot· New Surveys Show that Big Business Has 
a P.R. Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, at Cl ("Pollsters, researchers, evert many corporate 
chiefs themselves say that business is under attack by a majority of the public, which believes 
that executives are bent on destroying the environment, cooking the books and lining their 
own pockets."); Kurt Eichenwald, Big Test Looms for Prosecutors at Enron Trial, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 26, 2006, at AI ("Enron has emerged as a company that failed to follow the dictates of 
federal securities laws, with executives who deceived investors, directors and, in some cases; 
one another."); Arthur Levitt Jr., Cutting the Corruption, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2006, at Al5 
("As with many of the disgraced corporations of the past few years Adelphia, Tyco and 
WorldCom, for example--... [ c ]onflicts of interest abound, oversight has been myopic and 
those given the public's trust have used it to enrich themselves."). 
125. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 576. 
126. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A 
Case Study of Perverse incentives, Nonperfonnance Pay, and Camouflage, 30 J. CORP. L. 807, 
808 (2005) ("[T]he structure of both equity and non-equity compensation provides executives 
with incentives to inflate short-term earnings at the expense of long-tenn shareholder 
value."). 
• 
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managers, whose incentive-based compensation often depends on 
hitting certain performance ~gets, and shareholders, who may value 
more highly a slow, steady accumulation of value in the corporation. 127 
However, in this conflict between shareholder interests and managerial 
interests, boards consistently side with management, in part because 
their own incentives are linked to short-tenn perfonnance.128 
Director-primacy theorists are certainly correct to point out that, 
from the perspective of a nonnative theory of corporate governance, 
director primacy is preferable to managerialism because managers are 
less likely than directors to make shareholder wealth m · · · ation 
their prime objective!29 However, because director-primacy theory 
concedes that the purpose of the corporation is the m · · ation of 
shareholder wealth, shareholder primacy holds the normative edge 
over director primacy, even if directors do a fairly good job of looking 
out for shareholder interests. While rational-choice models seem to 
indicate that boards are well-equipped to promote shareholder 
interests,130 those models do not show that boards are better-equipped 
to do so than are the shareholders themselves. Thus, although the 
director-primacy model has a strong advantage over managerialism on 
the nonnative side, it cannot provide a general, normative model of 
how corporations should be run in the interests of shareholder wealth 
m · · ation because there are a small but significant number of 
circumstances where shareholder and board interests are not aligned. 
In such circumstances, the Rule creates an impediment to shareholders 
seeking to force boards to m · · e value for shareholders. Such an 
impediment is only proper where shareholder litigation threatens vital 
interests of the corporation. 
12 7. Id at 809-12 (detailing how executive pay at Fannie Mae created "perverse 
incentives" to inflate annual earnings but provided no penalties when the company later had 
to restate its earnings); Dallas, supra note 94, at 1365 (''[T]he new managerialism involves 
greater attention to short-tenn shareholder value, which also does not serve the interests of 
shareholders."). 
128. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at 205 (noting companies now routinely 
compensate directors with equity, including option grants). One recent study shows a 
correlation between executive pay and director pay, suggesting that directors will go along 
with managers in order to be rewarded more generously for their services to the company. 
Ivan E. Brick et al., CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Fiim Per!OJmance: 
Evidence of Cronyism?, 12 J. CoRP. FIN. 403; 421 (2006). 
129. See Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 561 ("In the famous debate between 
[managerialists] Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd, ... both theorists assumed the existence 
of managerial discretion distinct from powers delegated by the board of directors or from 
duties to shareholders."). 
130. See id. at 574-92 {contending directors have substantial incentives to run their 
corporations in the interests of the corporation's shareholders). 
• 
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While director primacy has the nonnative edge over 
managerialism, managerialism seems to have a far stronger empirical 
basis than the director-primacy model, and thus the director-primacy 
model is more vulnerable to criticism on the descriptive level than it is 
on the normative level. Directors do not run corporations; for the most 
part, they simply approve decisions made by executives. 131 Although 
those executives are, in theory, chosen by and accountable to the board, 
in reality, boards are generally dominated by corporate executives who 
do not have the time, the interest, the expertise, or the incentive to act 
as significant checks on managerial decision-making authority.132 
Decades ago, Melvin Eisenberg recognized that boards of 
directors had become largely passive. 133 Indeed, Eisenberg concluded: 
Many of the modem board's functions ... are for the most part 
relatively unimportant, or can easily be located elsewhere. Making 
business policy, although widely held to be a central board function, is 
usually beyond the competence of the board, since a corporate organ 
cannot be meaningfully involved in making business policy unless its 
members are highly active, and it is not realistic to expect a high degree 
of activity from the board.134 
Today, corporate boards' one significant remaining responsibility is the 
selection and monitoring of the corporation's CE0.135 However, 
passivity characterizes the board's typical role in that process as well.136 
The protections provided by the Rule, if applied in the context of 
131. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 140 ( 197 6) ("[A ]11 serious students of corporate affairs recognize that . . . in the 
typical large publicly held corporation the board does not 'manage' the corporation's business 
in the ordinary meaning of that tenn. Rather, that function is vested in the executives."). 
132. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 761 n.490 (DeL Ch. 2005), 
aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("[T]he law recognizes that corporate boards ... cannot 
themselves manage the operations of the ftnn, but may satisfy their obligations by 
thoughtfully appointing officers, establishing or approving goals and plans and monitoring 
perfonnance."). 
133. See EISENBERG, supra note 131, at 140 (citing research indicating that boards of 
large corporations did not initiate decisions on either specific or broad matters and were 
largely passively approving policies initiated by management). 
134. /d. at 169. 
135. See id. at 162 (describing the board's role in electing and dismissing CEOs as 
"both of critical importance to the corporation and uniquely suited for performance by the 
board''). 
13 6. See EISENBERG, supra note 131, at 164 (characterizing the board's role in 
selecting a CEO as "real albeit restrained"); RAKESH A, SEARCHING FOR A 
CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE iRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOs, at X (2002) (arguing 
that boards tend to select CEOs "for their social attributes rather than for their possession of 
relevant skills and experience"). 
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executive compensation, are a significant impediment to boards' 
performance of their most important remaining duty. 
Bainbridge notes that ~'modern boards of directors ... meet more 
often, are more independent from management, own more stock, and 
have better access to information" than their predecessors.137 
Bainbridge therefore contends that "board-capture'' by management 
"seems less valid today .... than it once was. " 138 However, there simply 
is not adequate evidence that recent reforms have had any effect on 
director performance.139 Rather, as recent corporate scandals establish, 
boards still too often merely rubber stamp the decisions of corporate 
officers. 140 
Though the reforms that Bainbridge-mentions are significant, it is 
hard to imagine how boards are now better able to control a 
corporation than they were previously, when outside directors still 
devote very little time to their directorial duties. Research suggests 
that the average outside director devotes 100 hours per year to his or 
her duties as director. 141 The nwnbers were not much different a 
generation ago. 142 Based on the amount of time outside directors 
devoted to their duties as board members in the 1980s, Bayless 
Manning concluded that no human being could stay on top of all of the 
aspects of a corporation's business ''on a one-and-a-half-day-a-month 
basis."143 Manning also noted that management, not outside directors, 
sets the agenda for board meetings.144 Boards thus largely rely on 
137. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 563. 
138. Id at 562. 
139. See KHuRANA, supra note 136~ at 81-82 (summarizing recent quantitative studies 
that indicate director shareholding has little effect on director behavior or fmn perfonnance ). 
Bainbridge's assertions to the contrary seem overly optimistic. See Bainbridge, supra note 
93, at 562-63 (citing trends in the 1980s and 1990s that "encourage more active and effective 
board oversight"). 
140. See Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modem Corporations: A Comparative 
Analysis ofGe1man and US. Corporate Structures, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 555, 588 
(2000) (stating that some boards rubber stamp anything that a corporate officer proposes); 
Eric A. Lustig, IRS, Inc. The IRS Oversight Board Effective Refo111i or Just Politics? 
Some Early Thoughts /Tom a Corporate Law Perspective, 42 DuQ. L. REv. 725, 755 (2004) 
("Commentators have long challenged whether the corporate board of directors actually 
governs corporations, or whether it is largely a rubber stamp for the chief executive officer, 
who is often the chainnan of the board."). 
141. BEBCHUK& FRIED, supmnote 47, at 37. 
142. Manning, supra note 24, at 1481 ("The most recent survey (1982) shows that the 
average director of a publicly held company devotes a total of about 123 hours per year to his 
board and committee work, including travel.")'., 
143. ld 
144. Idat 1484. 
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management to run things and intervene only in exceptional 
circumstances.145 
The fundamental insight of director primacy derives from 
Kenneth Arrow's view that decision-making structures must be based 
either on consensus or authority.146 Given these options, in large-scale 
business organizations, authority-based models have clear efficiency 
advantages over consensus-based models for decision making: ''[T]he 
chief economic virtue of the public corporation is not that it permits 
. . 
the aggregation of large capital pools, but rather that it provides a 
hierarchical decisionmaking structure well-suited to the problem of 
operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees, 
managers; shareholders, creditors, and other inputs."147 Following 
Arrow, the adherents of the director-primacy theory regard the balance 
between authority and accountability as a zero-sum game: the more 
boards are held accountable to shareholders, the less the corporation 
derives efficiency benefits from its hierarchical structure . 148 From this 
perspective1 the organizational advantage of the corporation is lost if 
the board's decision-making authority is subject to constant review by 
the consensus-based shareholders "If every decision of A is to be 
reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus of 
authority from A to R"149 
Bainbridge returns to this mantra at every opportunity,150 and yet 
he also acknowledges that "[t]he right to fire is not the right to exercise 
fiat; it is only the right to discipline."151 Indeed, it is no more 
145. See id at 1484-85 (describing two exceptional circumstances when boards seize 
the initiative). 
146. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68-70 ( 197 4 ). 
147. Bainbridge, supmnote 93, at 572. 
148. See Bainbridge, supra note 112, at 1654 (arguing against increasing shareholder 
power over review of board decisions "because it defeats the very purpose of authority-based 
decisionmaking structures namely, to concentrate discretionary authority in the hands of a 
central agency with power to make decisions that are binding on the whole"). 
149. ARRow, supra note 146, at 78 (emphasis added). A similar formula has been 
adopted by the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court: 
The power to hold to account is the power to interfere and, ultimately, the power to 
decide. If stockholders are given too easy access to courts; the effect is to transfer 
decisionmaking power from the board to the stockholders .... By limiting judicial 
review of board decisions, the-[Rule l preserves the statutory scheme of centralizing 
authority in the board of directors. 
Michael P. Dooley & E. Nonnan Veasey, The Role of the Board in Den·vative Litigation.: 
Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 Bus. LAW. 503, 522 ( 1989). 
150. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 108; Bainbridge, supra-note 93, at 573; 603; 
Bainbridge, supra note 112, at 1650, 1654. 
151. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 570. 
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problematic from the perspective of the efficiency of decision-making 
processes to recognize ultimate shareholder primacy than it is to 
recognize that the U.S. govermnent is ultimately answerable to the 
people. If every decision by a board were subject to the grueling 
process of shareholder review, corporate decision-making processes 
would grind to a halt, just as the U.S. govermnent could not function if 
every executive or legislative decision were subject to approval by 
plebiscite. Nonetheless, the U.S. government must, in the end, answer 
to the people, and corporate boards must answer to their shareholders. 
Moreover, as the advocates of director primacy acknowledge, because 
the mechanisms of shareholder oversight are cumbersome and 
expensive, there is little danger that shareholder primacy would throw 
a wrench into the mechanisms of corporate decision making, even if 
directors are not protected by the Rule!52 Even if the reality of 
corporate governance is that shareholders rarely yield actual control, 
the weakness of the director-primacy model is that it "overlooks the 
important (albeit limited) situations in which corporate legal rules do 
and should vest decision-making authority elsewhere."153 As the 
adherents of director primacy acknowledge, shareholder primacy 
remains the dominant view among corporate law scholars.154 
But that does not mean that most legal scholars view shareholders 
as controlling the day-to-day operations of the corporation. Rather, 
shareholders, often acting through courts, only occasionally take 
authority from the board in order to protect what most agree is the 
primary goal of the corporation, shareholder wealth m · · ation.155 
152. Id at 557-58. Bainbridge identifies collective action problems, as well as 
"rational apathy," as sources of shareholder inaction. Id But there are also numerous and 
significant procedural hurdles that shareholders must overcome before they can challenge 
board decisions, including the requirement that plaintiffs either make "demand" on the board 
to investigate the cause of action or claim that demand is excused as futile. Roberta Romano 
swnmarizes the issue very succinctly: "The efficacy of shareholder litigation as a governance 
mechanism is hampered by collective action problems because the cost of bringing a lawsuit, 
while less than shareholders' aggregate gain, is typically greater than a shareholder-plaintiff's 
pro rata benefit." Romano, supra note 82, at 55; see Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12 
(Del. 1984) ("[T]he demand requirement of Chancery Rule 23.1 exists at the threshold, frrst 
to insure that a stockholder exhausts his intracorporate remedies, and then to provide a 
safeguard against strike suits."). 
153. Hanewicz, supra note 121, at 520. 
154. See Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 563 ("Today, most corporate law scholars 
embrace some variant of shareholder primacy."); Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 85 ("In the 
academic literature, the prevailing answers to these questions [relating to the purposes and 
control of corporations] are provided by the shareholder primacy model."). 
155. See Hanewicz, supra note 121, at 515 ("[D]irector primacy overlooks the 
infrequent, but nonetheless important, times when decision-making authority is taken from 
the board and vested in other institutions, such as the courts or the shareholders."). 
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While the director-primacy approach has obvious advantages over the 
shareholder-primacy model in describing the day-to-day workings of 
corporations in which ordinary shareholders have little say, both de 
!iJcto and de jure, our system of corporate law recognizes that ultimate 
control lies in the hands of shareholders.156 
Director-primacy theorists contend that the major benefits of 
corporate governing structures are lost if the authority of directors is 
subordinated to that of shareholders.157 In fact, however, numerous 
factors, both practical and statutory, prevent shareholders from 
interfering in day-to-day decision-making processes involving 
corporate boards and executives. Nonetheless, in cases of conflict 
between the shareholders' interests and those of the board, 
shareholders must retain the ultimate authority to hold directors 
accountable, and the Rule should not impede existing mechanisms of 
director accountability to shareholders. 
c Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion permits some tentative conclusions. It 
is clear that despite its widespread use by courts to excuse directors 
from liability for violations of their duty of care, the Rule is a poorly 
understood piece of legal doctrine. Most courts view the Rule as either 
an evidentiary presutnption or a heightened standard of liability rather 
than as an abstention doctrine, and as such, it serves mostly to protect 
individual directors, not corporations, from the risks and costs of 
litigation. The interests of the corporation are protected only 
indirectly to the extent it is in the interest of the corporation to be 
able, through the Rule, to shield its directors from liability. Indeed, 
most justifications for the Rule focus on the need to protect 
directors because we believe them more qualified than judges to 
make business decisions, or because we want to encourage risk taking 
by business leaders, or because we think the structure of corporate 
governance entitles them to be checked only through the most 
deferential forms of review. None of these justifications for the Rule is 
satisfactory. Moreover, as a standard of review rather than an 
abstention doctrine, the Rule does relatively little to protect 
156. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (discussing the board's 
fiduciary duties owed to the company's shareholder owners). 
157. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 557 ("It is very hard (if not impossible) to 
imagine a modem public corporation that could be effectively run using consensus-based 
decisionmaking mechanisn1s."). 
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corporations from the harms attendant to litigation, especially the 
discovery process. 
The tendency of courts to view the Rule as requiring a heightened 
standard of review rather than as an abstention doctrine is curious 
because abstention makes more sense based on the standard 
justifications for the Rule. If the Rule exists because business leaders 
are better positioned to make business decisions than judges, changing 
the standard of review is clearly an inadequate solution. If a judge is 
not well-qualified to detern1ine whether a director's judgment was 
negligent, she is also not well-qualified to determine whether that 
judgment crossed the line from ordinary into gross negligence or some 
other such standard. Rather, if our concern is with competence, judges 
should simply refrain from any substantive review of business 
decisions taken by a non-self-interested board after due consideration 
and absent evidence of fraud or bad faith. 
Similarly, if the purpose of the Rule is to encourage risk taking by 
corporate decision makers, treating the Rule as a heightened standard 
of review is not nearly as effective as treating the Rule as an abstention 
doctrine. However, because statutory protections already shield board 
members from personal liability in most cases involving alleged 
breaches of the duty of care, the real purpose of the Rule today should 
not be to protect board members from liability but to protect the 
corporation and the board from the dissipation of assets and 
reputational harm that results from litigation. But a heightened 
standard of review does little to discourage litigation challenging board 
decisions, and, if courts do not treat the Rule as an abstention doctrine, 
they subject directors to the humiliation associated with a substantive 
review of their decision-making process, which in turn could deter 
boards from engaging in the risky business ventures that the Rule is 
designed to encourage. Only a rule of abstention that prevents any 
review of the substance of board decisions really insulates both boards 
and corporations from exposure to harmful litigation. 
Finally, if one subscribes to the sovereignty rationale behind the 
Rule, heightened scrutiny makes very little sense. If one believes that 
through the structures of corporate governance or through the nexus of 
contracts that create corporations, shareholders have delegated to 
corporate boards the authority to make decisions on behalf of the 
corporation, it should follow that courts should respect that contractual 
allocation of authority and abstain from review of board decisions 
rather than review such decisions under a deferential standard. 
• 
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Insofar as it embraces the abstention approach to the Rule, this 
Article advocates strengthening the Rule as a prophylactic tool that 
protects corporations from exposure to litigation. In its current 
incarnation, the Rule does little to protect the corporation's interests. 
. . 
Indeed, the dynamics of shareholder derivative suits leads to 
settlements that benefit plaintiffs' attorneys158 but not really the 
corporation or its shareholders, who end up paying for the suit through 
higher insurance costs the corporation is forced to pay. 159 
However, the Rule's deployment should be limited to those 
circumstances when the prospect of litigation genuinely threatens the 
well being of the corporation. Otherwise, the Rule prevents 
shareholder derivative suits from serving their purpose as a check on 
management 160 The Rule should apply only to cases in which the 
discovery attendant to litigation would require corporations to disclose 
prospective business plans. Such cases could arise in many contexts~ 
After a quick review of circumstances in which the Rule should still 
protect the business judgment of directors, this Article limits itself to 
the argument that, in almost all cases, a_ board_'s decision relating to 
executive compensation has nothing to do with its prospective business 
plans and thus should not be afforded the-protections of the Rule. Thi8 
Article addresses corporate governance regulations developed through 
state law. Congress responded to the corporate governance crisis 
associated with collapses at Enron, WorldCom, and other companies 
by enacting the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002.161 
158. See Romano, supm note 82, at 84 ("The principal beneficiaries of [shareholder 
derivative] litigation therefore appear to be attorneys, who win fee awards in 90 percent of 
settled suits."). 
159. See id at 57 ("Because 0&0 insurers reimburse both sides' expenses in a 
settlement, unlike other civil litigation, in -shareholder suits neither party internalizes litigation 
costs. A corporation's insurance premium may well rise following a lawsuit, but this cost is 
borne by all of the shareholders, rather than the litigating parties."). 
160. See id. at 84 (concluding that an empirical study of shareholder suits brought 
from the 1960s through 1987 provided little evidence that such suits deterred misconduct by 
corporate managers). 
161. Pub. L. No. 107 ... 204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as. amended in scattered sections of 
11, 15, 18 & 29 U.S.C. (Supp. 2005)). For an excellent, detailed discussion of the impact of 
. . . 
Sarbanes Oxley on the law of corporate governance and directors' fiduciary duties, see 
Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a Climate of 
Corporate Govemance Rcfo1m, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. (forthcoming 2007). 
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ill. THE RULE AND FORCED DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS PLANS 
A. The Need To Protect Corporations Against Forced Disclosure 
Litigation is expensive. Shareholder derivative litigation is 
especially expensive. 162 But the cost is unacceptably high when a 
corporation might be forced to reveal its business plans in order to 
respond to the discovery requests of a -plaintiff or plaintiff class. 
Conceived as an abstention doctrine, one purpose of the Rule is 
to get suits dismissed before the corporation is forced to produce 
confidential documents in discovery. The Rule is thus deployed in the 
interests of the corporation rather than in the interests of its directors. 
It protects the corporation and the confidential decision-making 
processes through which boards run corporations~ Treating the: Rule 
either as an evidentiary presumption or a standard of review only 
protects directors from liability; it does nothing to protect corporations 
from exposure to damaging litigation. However, the Rule should not 
be used to head off all litigation against corporate defendants; absent 
the Rule's protections, litigation can serve as an effective constraint on 
corporate directors helping to enforce the duty of care. 
Only when litigation requires disclosure of prospective business 
plans should courts invoke the Rule as an abstention doctrine. In those 
circumstances, a court should inquire only into whether the board's 
decision-making process was proper, and, if' so, the court should 
eschew any substantive evaluation of the board's decision. If the Rule 
is applied in such a manner, it will achieve the goal of protecting the 
corporation from undue intrusion into its internal matters. 
1.. Mergers and Acquisitions 
Decisions about mergers and acquisitions often involve life-and-
death decisions about the future of a corporation. 163 Challenging a 
board in the process of considering its merger and/or acquisition 
options would clearly require the disclosure of information crucial to 
the corporation's prospective business plans. In such circumstances, 
162. See id. at 58 (stating that shareholder suits "are the largest and most expensive 
category of claims filed against directors and officers'').. One of the key reasons why 
shareholder derivative litigation is a weak check on the power of corporate managers is such 
litigation is so expensive. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 568 n.l 01. 
163. Se.e.t e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 E2d 39; 47 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[A] merger 
... is the most important event that can occur in a small corporation's life, to wit, its death 
.... ;'); Alessi v. Beracha, 849 A.2d 939, 949 (Del. Ch. 2004) (describing a transaction in 
which the Sara Lee Corporation would purchase the Earthgrains Company as the most 
important transaction in Earthgrains' short .life '"to wit, its death'"). 
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the Rule should apply to protect the corporation from having to 
disclose all information other than information relating to the propriety 
of the board's decision-making processes. It is possible that even after 
a merger or acquisition has been completed, the substantive rationale 
underlying the relevant business decisions should be protected by the 
Rule as the merger or acquisition in question might be merely one step 
in a larger business plan that will entail future transactions. In most 
cases, therefore, involving challenges to a board's decision relating to 
mergers or acquisitions, courts should invoke the Rule as an abstention 
doctrine and limit themselves to reviewing only the procedural 
propriety of the board's decision-making process in relation to the 
transaction. 
2. Dividend Policies 
Dodgd64 is most commonly cited to illustrate the principle of 
shareholder primacy. 165 The Ford Motor Company lost the part of that 
case relating to Henry Ford's decision not to issue large dividends 
because Henry Ford testified he wanted to invest in the company in 
order to '"employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this 
industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build 
up their lives and their homes. '"166 The court ordered Ford to issue a 
large dividend to its shareholders because Henry Ford could not be 
permitted to continue the corporation ''as a semi-eleemosynary 
institution."167 Admonishing Mr. Ford, the court noted that "[a] 
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders."168 The case was wrongly decided in my 
view, not because the court was wrong about shareholder primacy, but 
because Henry Ford understood that he could not testify truthfully 
about his reasons for not issuing a large dividend to Ford's 
shareholders without revealing prospective business plans and his 
164. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W 668 (Mich. 1919). 
165. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transfo1mations of the Corporate 
Fo1111: A Histoncal Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL.l CORP. L. 767, 
769 n.8 (2005) (calling Dodge the classic affinnation of the shareholder-primacy doctrine); 
Nathan Oman, Corporations and Autonomy Theones of Contract: A Critique of the New Lex 
Mercatoria, 83 DENY. U. L. REv. 101, 135 (2005) (''The locus classicus for the shareholder 
primacy norm is Dodge .... "); Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Through an Antitrust Lens, 
92 COLUM. L. REv. 497, 520 (1992) ("Dodge has long been considered the preeminent 
example of the shareholder primacy view of the corporation .... '?). 
166. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683. 
167. Id 
168. Id at 684. 
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concerns regarding the threat of competition from the Dodge brothers, 
who held a ten percent interest in Ford.169 
A few years before the Dodge brothers brought their suit against 
Ford, they had stopped supplying Ford with parts and began to build 
their own cars to compete with Ford.170 At the sante time, John Dodge 
stepped down from Ford's board after having served as a director for 
ten years. 171 Henry Ford had very real concerns about the prospect that 
the Dodge brothers might use their dividends from his company to 
launch a rival corporation that would endanger Ford's ability to 
generate profits for its shareholders in the future. 17~ This is precisely 
the situation in which the Rule, as an abstention doctrine, should apply, 
because Henry Ford's decision to resist paying out large dividends to 
shareholders was based on his concerns about competition from the 
Dodge brothers, concerns he reasonably believed he could not disclose 
without doing harm to his company. 
But it by no means will always be the case that decisions relating 
to dividend policies will relate to a corporation's prospective business 
plans and thus be entitled to the Rule's protections. For example, in 
the notorious Kamin v. American Express Co., American Express 
decided to issue to its shareholders a one-time, in-kind dividend of 
stock in Donaldson, Lufkin, and Jenrette (DLJ), which had declined 
significantly in value while in American Express' possession.173 
Plaintiffs criticized the American Express board's decision to issue the 
in-kind dividend on the ground that American Express thereby lost the 
tax benefit it might otherwise have gained by selling the stock and 
realizing the capital loss. 174 The board argued that taking such a loss 
would have hurt the value of the stock, but the vast majority of 
scholars agree with plaintiffs that the company's stock price already 
reflected the decline in the value of the DLJ stock, and thus the 
issuance of the in-kind dividend was, at-best, poorly informed from the 
• 
169. ld at 669-70. 
170. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy No1111, 23 J. CoRP. L. 277, 316 
(1998). 
171. ld 
172. See Dodge, 170 N. W. at 671-72. The opinion reproduced a letter from the Dodge 
brothers asking Henry Ford to "'advise us by early mail as to whether there is any foundation 
for the rumors referred to and that plans for the extension or expansion of the operations of 
business of the company that would absorb any considerable part of the company's present 
resources, are under consideration and the status of any negotiations relating thereto."' Jd at 
672. 
173. Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 387 
N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). 
174. Jd at 809~10. 
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perspective of the efficient-capital-markets hypothesis.175 The court 
deferred to the board's decision under the Rule.176 This decision seems 
to have had nothing to do with the company's prospective business 
plans, and the discovery attendant to the case revealed nothing about 
the company that was not already public knowledge. The board seems 
to have made a bad decision, and there is no reason why it should not 
be held liable if that decision was a negligent one.177 
3. Application to Questions of Executive Compensation 
What sort of a business judgment is the decision to provide for a 
certain sort of pay package for a corporate executive? In practice, 
decisions on executive compensation are delegated to a compensation 
committee rather than being addressed by the board as a whole.178 The 
175. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious PoJ+er.· 
La~ Nonns, and the Self-Goveming Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1619, 1672 (2001) 
(characterizing the board's decision as "a pretty dumb one"); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Getting 
Real About Corporate Social Responsibility: A Reply to Professor Greenfield, 35 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REv. 645,657 n.33 (2002) (characterizing the board's decision as having cost the company 
$8 million); Eric Talley; Taking the '1'' Out of "Team':· Intra-Finn Monitoring and the 
Conte11t of Fiduciary Duties, 24 J. CoRP. L. 1001, 1009 (1999) (characterizing the board's 
decision as "almost certainly misguided"); Elliott J. Weiss, Teaching Accounting and 
Valuation in the Basic Co1poration Law Course, 19 CARDOzo L. REv. 679, 691 (1997) 
(noting that the board action did not serve shareholders interests, because "any investor 
interested in American Express would have found it very easy to learn that American Express 
had in fact incurred [a] loss" on its DLJ stock). 
176. See K81i1in, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811 (''It is not enough to allege, as plaintiffs do here, 
that the directors made an imprudent decision, which did not capitalize on the possibility of 
using a potential capital loss to offset capital gains. More than imprudence or mistaken 
judgment must be shown."). 
177. Some scholars also point to Kamin as evidence that corporate managers are 
encouraged to engage in questionable accounting practices. See, e.g., Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron 's Dark Shadows, 51 
Bus. LAW~ 1421, 1447 (2002) C'The Kamin board's decision suggests that it was more 
important to make decisions yielding superior accounting (maximizing income) than superior 
economics (maximizing after-tax dollars)."); Gevurtz, supra note 28, at 1262 ("[T]he court 
held that it was entirely appropriate . . . for the directors of American Express to cause the 
company to lose millions of dollars for the sole purpose of improving reported earnings and 
thereby maintaining the price at which the company's stock traded."); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, 
Discussing Corporate Misbehavior: The Conflicting No1ms of Market, Agenc.;g Profit and 
Loyalty, 10 BROOK. L. REv. 1213, 1226 & n.16 (2005) (describing the Kamin court as 
condoning cooking the books to inflate the company's apparent value); Daniel J.H. 
Greenwood, Enronitis: JVhy Good Corporations Go Bad, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 773, 
821 n.89 ("[T]he [KatmiJ] court rested its decision solely on the astonishing rationale offered 
by management: deceiving investors was good for them."). 
178. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at 24 ("Boards of large public companies 
delegate to compensation committees the task of working out the critical details of executive 
compensation arrangements."); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There's a 
Problem, Mat's the Remedy? The Case for "Compensation Discussion and Analysis, ,'30 J. 
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compensation conunittee, in turn, relies on the advice of a 
compensation expert. 179 Those experts are hired through processes that 
the CEO is able to influence.180 The chosen experts therefore have no 
incentive to look out for shareholder interests and every incentive to 
use their discretion in favor of executives. 181 Often boards of directors 
do not even meet with the consultants on whose opinions they 
purportedly rely. 182 
Directors speaking under conditions of anonymity acknowledge 
the conflict of interest at the heart of the business of compensation 
experts. 183 One noted that "consultants are hired by management. 
They're going to be rehired by management."184 Another remarked that 
"[t]he basic goal of compensation consultants is to justify whatever it 
is the CEO wants to make. After all, who's going to recommend these 
consultants to other CEOs?"'85 
The basic process seems to be fundamentally one-sided, with no 
elements of input wei . · g in on the side of reining in executive pay. 
When boards set compensation levels, they look to compensation 
levels at firms they view as comparable, and they are unlikely to view 
CORP. L. 675, 689 (2005) ("[B]oards increasingly have devolved the responsibility for 
executive compensation to a specific compensation committee."). 
179. Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the Intemational CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture 
or Market Driven?, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1171, 1191 (2004) ("To assist it in performing its tasks, 
the Compensation Committee will usually retain the services of an expert compensation 
consultant."). 
180. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at 38 ("Typically, consultants have been 
hired through a finn's human resources departrnent, and CEOs have often been involved in 
the selection process."). . 
181. See id (noting consultants are not beholden in any way to shareholders and 
"could only benefit from using their discretion to favor the CEO"). 
182. Rowtdtable, J.Vhats Wrong with Executive Compensation?, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan. 
2003, at 68, 71 (statement of John England, Compensation Consultant) ("But in almost 20 
years of consulting at the board level, I've only seen a handful of conunittees regularly call 
executive sessions with the compensation consultant."). 
183. See Carol J. Loomis, (This Stuff Is Wrong, 'FORTUNE, June 25,2001, at 73, 74. 
184. Id 
185. Id at 80; see Ryan Miske, Note, Can't Cap Corporate Greed· Unintended 
Consequences of Trying To Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 
MINN. L. REv. 1673, 1696 (2004) ("Without compensation committees composed solely of 
independent directors who assess the worth of the company's executives at arm's length, 
compensation caps will simply be circumvented with the assistance of creative lawyers, 
accountants, and compensation experts~"); Mark A. Salky, Comment, The Regulatory 
Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither 
Necessary?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 795, 800 (1995) ("Essentially, CEOs set their own salaries 
through the use of a submissive board of directors as well as clever compensation consultants 
who draft compensation packages aroWld the various restraints established for curbing 
excessive pay."). 
2007] BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 871 
the CEO they want to hire or retain as merely average.186 As one 
former CEO put it, "[t]he main reason compensation increases every 
year is that most boards want their CEO to be in the top half of the 
CEO peer group, because they think it makes the company look 
strong."187 
Even those who seek refonn of executive compensation offer few 
strategies that would change the dynamic whereby corporate 
executives sit on corporate boards and pay their peers salaries in line 
with what they in turn would want to be paid.188 And the problem of 
executive compensation only becomes worse with the advent of 
generous options packages. As one fornter executive summarized his 
• 
expenence: 
Let's say a board is discussing whether to award the CEO options on 2 
million shares. During the conversation, somebody points out that the 
options aren't going to be an expense, so they won't cost the company 
an · g when they're granted. Someone else picks up on that and 
says, "In that case, why not give the CEO options on 4 million?"189 
Some have placed hope for reform in the advent of independent 
compensation committees, but people with experience on corporate 
b·oards dismiss the notion that boards or compensation committees can 
truly be independent of CEOs.190 
In designing pay packages, consultants draw on nonpublic pay 
data companies make available to them and they agree to keep . 
confidential. 191 The companies have an incentive to share this 
information with compensation consultants because the information 
assists the consultants in improving the design of executive 
186. Gordon, supra note 178, at 687. 
187. Whats Wrong with Executive Compensation?, supra note 182, at 72 (statement 
of Edgar S. Woolard, Jr., former CEO of DuPont). 
188. See id at 70 (statement of Eric Roiter, Senior Vice President and General 
Counsel, Fidelity Mgmt. & Research Co.) ("The test might be based on benchmarks for peer 
groups and adjusted to temper the spread between the pay of the most senior officers and that 
of the rnnk and file."). 
189. Id (statement of Peter Clapman, Senior Vice President and Chief Counsel for 
Investments, TIAA-CREF). 
190. See id at 71 ("Ultimately, the CEOs of public corporations still have a lot of 
power over the process, over the selection of directors, over the decisions of compensation 
committees."); id at 72 (statement of Edgar S. Woolard, Jr.) (characterizing as a "myth" the 
notion that compensation committees are independent); see also BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra 
note 4 7, at 81 (noting that large boards, having outside directors who sit on multiple boards, 
and interlocking directorates all make it less likely that the board will be independent of the 
CEO). 
191. See Mats Wrong with Executive Compensation?, supra note 182, at 70. 
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compensation.192 Thus, when boards rely on compensation experts to 
set executive compensation, their decision does not involve any 
confidential information relating to the company on whose board they 
sit. In fact, such decisions are usually based on information relating to 
other companies. In such circumstances, litigation challenging board 
decisions regarding executive pay does not threaten the corporation 
with forced disclosure of prospective business plans, and the Rule 
should not apply. 
B The Rule and the Disney Litigation 
. . 
The growth of executive pay in the United States since the 1990s 
has been simply breathtaking. In 1991, the average large-company 
CEO outearned the average worker by a factor of 140; by 2003, the 
ratio was 500: I. 193 Although executives account for a very small 
percentage of a corporation's employees, their compensation accounts 
for a large portion of a corporation's expenditures.194 Between 1998 
and 2002, the 1500 companies in the ExecuComp database paid about 
$100 billion to their top 5 executives. 195 In 2003, compensation to the 
top 5 executives in all public companies in the previous 3 years 
equaled 10% of those companies' earnings. 196 
A 1992 study found that, going back to 1900, courts have almost 
never overturned decisions relating to compensation for executives at 
publicly traded companies.197 As of 1996, there were almost no rulings 
by appellate courts affirming an order to reduce executive 
compensation at a public company based on a theory of waste.198 
There is considerable evidence that boards are never really actually 
independent when they decide on executive compensation, and so the 
most straightforward argument against the use of the Rule in the 
context of executive compensation is simply that even under traditional 
justifications of the Rule, the fact that most board members are 
beholden to the CEO creates a conflict of interest that should preclude 
192. Jd 
193. BEBCHUK& FRJED, supm note 47, at 1. 
194. Bainbridge, supmnote 112, at 1619. 
195. Jd 
196. Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Every Underachiever, An Ove1paid Board?, N.Y. 
Tnvrns, Jan. 22, 2006, § 3, at 1. 
197. Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to 
Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 81-82 (1992). 
198. Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a Modest 
Proposal for (Further) Refo1m, 50 SMU L. Rev. 20 l, 214-15 ( 1996). 
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the use of the Rule. 199 Even defenders of high executive compensation 
acknowledge that the problem of structural bias in favor of high 
compensation is intractable: 
We are dealing with people; by and large, who know one another and 
have cotmnon experiences, and it's not an environment likely· to foster a 
great deal of independence· from the CEO among board members~ And 
in trying to create independence, you do not want to create an 
adversarial relationship. 200 
However, courts have repeatedly rejected plaintiffs' claims that the 
Rule should not be applied to executive compensation cases based on 
directors' professional indebtedness to the CE0.201 
Making the Rule inapplicable to decisions relating to executive 
compensation is not the only solution to the problem of executive pay. 
Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
proposed new disclosure rules relating to executive pay.202 Others have 
suggested the SEC go further and require shareholder approval of the 
pay packages the SEC would require corporations to disclose.203 But 
199. See BEBCHUK & FRIED~ supra note 47, at 27-J6 (identifYing CEOs' power to 
benefit directors through interlocking boards, and the CEO power to set levels of director 
compensation, social and psychological factors that prevent directors from challenging 
CEOs, and the small cost to directors of favoring executives preventing arms-length 
negotiation of executive compensation). 
200. Whats wrong with Executive Compensation?, supm note 182, at 71 (statement 
of Joe Bachelder, Executive Compensation Lawyer, Bachelder Law Fim1); see BEBCHUK & 
FRIED, supra·note 41, at 80 (s · · g factors that increase CEO influence over a board). 
20 l. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693; 761 n.488 (Del. Ch. 
2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (noting that Disney CEO, Michael Eisner; surrounded 
himself with "yes men" and "non-employee directors who would have sycophantic 
tendencies" but nonetheless concluding that the board had exercised independent judgment). 
In a recent shareholder derivative action alleging breach of fiduciary duty based on a failure 
of oversight by the board of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, the Delaware Supreme Court 
found demand was not excused because a majority of the directors were independent of 
Martha Stewart despite the fact that they had long been friends with her and/or done business 
with her~ Beam ex rel Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc.~ Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 
1050-55 (Del. 2004). But see Pereira v: Cogan, 294 B.R. 449,517, 52R (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(holding directors liable for failure of oversight of executive compensation after fmding the 
corporation's two-member compensation committee lacked independence). See generally 
Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committee~ and the Vagaries of 
Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. RE'l 1305, 1310 (2005) ("The overwhelming majority of 
courts ... have rejected the structural-bias concept.''). 
202. See Stephen Labaton, S.E C To Require More Disclosure of Executive Pay, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at AI (reporting proposed new rules would require public corporations 
to provide "a figure for total compensation, including significant perks, stock options and 
retirement benefits" for the five top-paid executives). 
203. Gordon, supra note 178, at 693-701 (calling on the SEC to require proxy 
disclosure of a "Compensation Discussion and Analysis" and urging consideration of a 
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there seems to be little hope that such reforms will have a large impact 
on executive pay. 204 
1. The Problem of Pay Without Performance 
As their critics acknowledge, Harvard's Lucian Bebchuk and 
Berkeley's Jesse Fried (and their collaborators) have made a significant 
contribution to our understanding of executive compensation.205 Their 
fundamental insight is that "[t]he absence of effective arm's-length 
dealing under today's system of corporate governance ... has been the 
primary source of problematic compensation arrangements."206 One 
consequence of the fact that executive compensation does not result 
from arm's-length negotiations is that executive cash compensation 
"has been at best weakly correlated with finns' industry-adjusted 
perforn1ance" and other forms of executive compensation, including 
favorable loans, pensions, deferred compensation, and perks, "have 
tended to be insensitive to managerial performance."207 In fact, one 
recent study found highly paid CEOs who run large fmns and are not 
subject to monitoring by large shareholders perform worse than their 
more poorly paid peers.208 
The fact that executive com 
generous does not necessarily 
tion packages are extraoli · · y 
mean that they are excessive.209 
shareholder approval vote on that disclosure, a practice recently adopted in the United 
Kingdom). 
204. See Labaton, supra note 202, at Al (noting proposed new SEC rules are not 
expected to have much of an impact on executive pay). 
205. Gordon, supra note 178, at 677 (articulating concerns about Bebchuk and Fried's 
book); Bainbridge, supra note 112, at 1618 ("[Bebchuk and Fried's text] makes a significant 
and valuable contribution to the literature by synthesizing and systematizing the managerialist 
account of executive compensation."); William W Bratton, The Academic Tournament over 
Executive Compensation, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1557, 1561 (2005) (reviewing BEBCHUK & FRJED, 
supra note 47) (acknowledging the reform called for by Bebchuk and Fried will not occur 
anytime soon but praising their "robust criticism'' of current boardroom practices); John E. 
Core et al., Is US. CEO Compensation Ineflicient Pay Without Perfonnance?, 103 MICH. L. 
REv. 1142, 1142 (2005) (reviewing same) ("Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried 
develop and summarize the leading critiques of cw-rent executive compensation practices in 
the United States." (footnotes omitted)). 
206. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at ix. 
207. Id at 7; see Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the 
Managena.J Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CoRP. 
L. 255, 290 (2005) (concluding that managerial power over directors dramatically impacts 
executive compensation). 
208. Lewis A. Kornhauser et al., lhe Good, the Bad and the Lucky: CEO Pay and 
Ski/16 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Papers, No. 9, 2005), 
available athttp://lsr.nellco.org/nyullewp/papers/9. 
209. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at 8 (distinguishing their approach from 
"moral," "fairness-based," or "populist" opposition to high executive compensation). But see 
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However, from the perspective of this Article, it does not matter 
whether it makes sense generally for executives to be generously 
compensated. What matters is that executive compensation constitutes 
a significant corporate expenditure.. The question. is whether there is 
any reason to use the Rule to protect directors who make poor 
decisions regarding executive compensation from liability in 
connection with those decisions. From that perspective-, Bebchuk and 
Fried's work on the disconnect between executive pay and performance 
is of great significance, even if we believe that highly competent or 
successful executives are entitled to extremely generous compensation 
packages. 
Bebchuk and. Fried have identified four ways in which standard 
executive compensation contracts create perverse incentives and 
reward executives regardless of performance, while preventing 
shareholders from knowing the details of executive compensation.210 
Boards that approve such executive contracts should not be pennitted 
the deference accorded to other sorts of decisions under the Rule. 
First, executive compensation contracts now routinely reward 
executives for reporting higher earnings, creating an incentive for 
executives to boost their numbers.211 However, when, as in the case of 
Fannie Mae, those numbers turn out to be grossly misstated, executive 
compensation contracts do not provide for a downward adjustment of 
compensation commensurate with the overstatement of eat"nings.212 
Second, executives who resign in disgrace receive extremely generous 
compensation packages, as long as they have not been fired for 
''cause;' a term that is narrowly defined in standard executive 
compensation contracts.213 'fhird, largely in order to avoid the tax 
Gordon, supra note 178, at 677 (contending that the outrage caused by executive 
compensation is not explained by the disconnect between pay and performance alone). 
210. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 126, at 807-08 (outlining four problems with 
Fannie Mae's executive pay arrangements). 
211. Id at 809-12. 
212. Jdat8l0. 
213. Jd at 812. For example, Fannie Mae's CEO, Franklin Raines, who was dismissed 
in an accounting scandal, received a retirement package worth at least $32 million. Id 
Fannie Mae ~s CFO, Timothy Howard, received a $6 million pension. Id The authors note 
that "poor operating petformance, deception, or earnings manipulation that falls short of the 
legal definition of fraud are not groWlds for a for cause tennination" under Raines and 
Howard's contracts. Jd Moreover; under Fannie Mae executives' contracts, had they been 
dismissed for "cause," Raines' severance package would have been reduced by only $7 
million and Howard's package would not have been reduced at all. Id at 813; see In re Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 759 (DeL Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 .A.2d 27 (Del. 
2006) (upholding the board's determination that Michael Ovitz could not be terminated "for 
cause''). 
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implications of nonperformance-based executive salaries in excess of 
$1 million,214 corporations circt1n1vent this limit by providing generous 
retirement benefits that are not linked to performance.215 
Finally, corporations use postretirement payments to camouflage 
large amounts of compensation that are not based on performance.216 
[C]ompensation arrangements have often been designed with an eye to 
camouflaging rent and minimizing outrage. Finns have systematically 
taken steps that make less transparent both the total amount of 
compensation and the extent to which it is decoupled from n1anagers' 
own perfortnance. Managers' interest in reduced transparency has been 
served by the design of numerous compensation practices, such as 
postretirement perks and consulting arrangements, deferred 
compensation, pension plans, and executive loans.217 
In the context of executive compensation, the camouflage argument is 
the best response to the corporate sovereignty defense of the Rule.218 
Boards cannot be held accountable to shareholders if they do not 
disclose the nature of executive compensation, and when they design 
executive contracts so as to circumvent shareholder oversight, they 
should not be entitled to the protections of the Rule. But retirement 
payments are not the only aspect of executive compensation that is 
camouflaged. "[U]ntil very recently, SEC rules haven't required 
companies to disclose the scope or even the existence of option plans 
that haven't been approved by shareholders."219 
2. Application in the Disney Case 
In January 1997, plaintiffs brought a claitn against Disney and its 
directors for a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the hiring of 
Ovitz to be Disney's President in 1995 and in connection with the 
214. I.R.C. § l62(m) (2000). 
215. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at 92-93; Bebchuk & Fried, supm note 126, at 
816; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits, 
I BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 291, 295 (2004). 
216. BEBCHUK& FRIED, supra note 47, at 95-111; Bebchuk & Fried, supmnote 126, at 
816-21; Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 215, at 316-19. 
217. BEBCHUK& FRIED, supra note 47, at 6. 
218. The camouflage argument does not only apply to the question of executive 
compensation. As Gevurtz has suggested, the Kamin court applied the Rule to prevent 
American Express directors from facing liability for issuing a dividend to shareholders that 
prevented the company from realizing an $8 million tax savings. Gevurtz, supra note 28, at 
i267-68. Worse still, the court never questioned the business practice that cost shareholders 
$8 million that was to hide a significant loss on a failed investment rather than disclosing the 
loss. Jd 
219. Roundtable, supra note 182, at 71 (statement of Jamie Heard, CEO, Institutional 
Shareholder Servs. ). 
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Disney board's approval of a $140 million severance payment in 
connection with Ovitz's termination late in 1996.220 The case has now 
been argued twice before the Delaware Supreme Court.221 Its facts and 
. . . 
history illustrate the problems with utilizing the Rule to shield 
directors from liability challenges to a board's approval of executive 
compensation plans. 
a. The Facts of the DisneyCase 
In late sununer 1995, Disney CEO, Michael Eisner, and Ovitz 
negotiated an Employment Agreement (the OEA) whereby Ovitz, who 
was a close friend of Eisner,222 would become President of Disney and 
Eisner's second-in-connnand. The only members of Disney's board of 
directors who were infonned of and participated in the negotiations 
were. hwin Russell, who was then chairman of Disney's compensation 
conunittee, and Raymond Watson, another member of the 
compensation committee.223 Russell was also Eisner's personal 
attorney. 224 A compensation expert, Graef Crystal, was consulted 
during the negotiations, performed various calculations, and prepared 
spreadsheets evaluating the compensation packages being considered 
for Ovitz.225 Eisner's employment agreement, along with that of 
Ovitz's predecessor, Frank Wells, served as a template for the OEA.226 
Russell cautioned that Ovitz's level of compensation and the number 
of stock options being offered to hitn went "far beyond the standards 
applied within Disney and corporate America."227 Crystal also 
expressed concern about the magnitude of Ovitz's pay package, as well 
220. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A~2d 244, 248-49 (Del. 2000) (summarizing plaintiffs' 
claims: (I) the Disney board breached its fiduciary duty in approving an "extravagant and 
wasteful Employment Agreement'' with Ovitz; (2) the Disney board breached its fiduciary 
duty in agreeing to an "extravagant and wasteful" nonfault termination of Ovitz; and (3) the 
directors were not disinterested and independent). 
221 .. The case was affumed by the Delaware Supreme Court on June 8, 2006. In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
222. Sec Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249; In rc Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 
693, 699-706 (Del. Ch. 2005); aff'd, 906 A.2d 27. 
223. In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 702. 
224. Id at 747 n.488. 
225. ld at 704-05. 
226. Id at 703. 
227. Id at 704. 
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as the incentives it created.228 It appears Russell and Crystal's concerns 
were ·never shared with Disney's board of directors .. 229 
On August 14th, 1995, having discussed the matter with only a 
few members of Disney's board of directors, Eisner entered into a 
letter agreement with Ovitz (OLA), outlining the basic terms of his 
employment.230 Although the OLA provided that it was subject to 
approval by the compensation committee and the board, Disney issued 
a press release the day the OLA was signed, making Ovitz's hiring a 
matter of public knowledge.231 Ovitz was hired over the strenuous 
objections of at least three of Disney's inside directors, and Ovitz's 
hiring was therefore made conditional on his concession that two of his 
supposed subordinates would report directly to Eisner. 232 
The terms of Ovitz's employment were approved during a one-
hour meeting of-Disney's compensation committee at which it was one 
of five matters on the agenda.233 Crystal did not attend the meeting, 
and neither the OEA nor his analysis of the OEA were distributed to 
the compensation committee.234 Instead, Russell and Watson 
Sllmtnarized Crystal's analysis.235 The compensation committee did not 
consider the following terms of the OEA: 
(1) the purchase of Ovitz's private jet for $187,000 over the appraised 
value; (2) the purchase of Ovitz's BMW at acquisition cost and not the 
depreciated market value; (3) the purchase of Ovitz's computers at 
replacement value instead of their lower book value; (4) any specific list 
of perquisites, despite ·Eisner already agreeing to provide Ovitz with 
nwnerous such benefits; and (5) that despite Ovitz's bonus being 
payable completely on a discretionary basis, Russell's memorandum to 
228. See id at 705 (''Crystal was philosophically opposed to a pay package that would 
give Ovitz the best of both worlds ie., low risk and high return."). 
229. Only Eisner heard of Russell's concerns. See id at 704 ("Russell did not provide 
this Case Study [outlining the OEA parameters] to any other member of Disney's board of 
directors."); id at 705-06 ("Crystal's letter was never circulated to any board member other 
than Eisner~"). 
230. Id at 707. 
231. Id at 708. 
232. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 250 (Del. 2000) ("When Eisner told three 
members of the Old Board in mid-August 1995 that h~ had decided to hire Ovitz, all three 
'denounced the decision."'); In re Disney, 907 A.2d 693, 706 (reporting that Disney's General 
Counsel and Chief Operating Officer Sanford Litvack and Chief Financial Officer Stephen 
Bollenbach immediately made it clear that they would not report to Ovitz but would continue 
to report to Eisner). 
233. In re Disney, 907 A.2d 693, 708. One of those items was the approval of a 
$250,000 payment to Russell for his role in negotiating Ovitz's contract. Appellants' Opening 
Brief, supra note 62, at 11. 
234. In re Disney, 901 A.2d 693, 709. 
235. Id 
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Ovitz indicating that the bonus would likely approximate $7.5 million 
uall 236 ann y. 
Immediately after the compensation committee meeting, Disney's 
board of directors heard Watson explain his analysis of the OEA, and 
he and Russell responded to the board's questions on the matter.237 The 
board then voted unanimously to elect Ovitz as Disney's president.238 
Although there is some dispute as to this matter, the court 
concluded that Eisner was generally positive about Ovitz's 
performance during his first few months at Disney.239 However, 
matters deteriorated quickly in 1996.240 By the fall of 1996, it was 
clear to all but Ovitz that he had no future at Disney.241 The OEA 
provided for three possible ways by which Ovitz might be terminated: 
He might serve his five years and Disney might decide against offering 
him a new contract. If so, Disney would owe Ovitz a $10 million 
termination payment. Before the end of the initial term, Disney could 
terminate Ovitz for "good cause" only if Ovitz committed gross 
negligence or malfeasance, or if Ovitz resigned voluntarily. Disney 
would owe Ovitz no additional compensation if it tem1inated hirn for 
"good cause." Termination without cause (non-fault tennination) would 
entitle Ovitz to the present value of his remaining salary payments 
through September 30, 2000, a $10 million severance payment, an 
additional $7.5 million for each fiscal year remaining under the 
agreement, and the immediate vesting of the frrst 3 million stock 
options (the ''A" Options).242 
Eisner had General Counsel and Chief Operating Officer Sanford 
Litvack look into the possibility of terminating Ovitz for cause, but he 
and Litvack both concluded that cause was lacking.243 It is not clear 
that the issue of for-cause termination was ever raised with Disney's 
board.244 
236. Jd at 709 n.85. 
237. Jd at 710. 
238. Id 
239. See id at 713 n.120 (citing three letters from Eisner written late in 1995 
indicating Eisner's favorable impressions of Ovitz's performance at that time and rmding not 
credible the contrary testimony of Sid Bass, then Disney's largest shareholder). 
240. ld at 724. 
241. Jd 
242. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 250 (Del. 2000) (footnote omitted). 
243. In re Disney, 901 A.2d at 728-29. 
244. See id at 731 (noting that "there is some controversy as to whether any details of 
the NFf and the cause question were discussed" at the November 25, 1996, executive session 
at which Eisner announced his intention to fire Ovitz by year's end) . 
• 
• 
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After reviewing the various accounts of Ovitz's performance, the 
court concluded there were "three competing theories as to why Ovitz 
was not successful."245 However, for the purposes of determining 
whether defendants could be held liable for breach of the duty of care 
in connection with Ovitz's hiring and frring, the court remarked that "it 
makes no difference why Ovitz was not as successful as his reputation 
would have led many to expect, so long as he was not grossly negligent 
or malfeasant."246 
The court relegated to the footnotes the testimony most relevant 
to plaintiffs' claim that defendants breached their fiduciary duties and 
committed waste by paying Ovitz a severance package worth 
approximately $140 million based on a no-fault termination (NFT) 
when there was evidence Ovitz justifiably could have been terminated 
for cause. For example, Eisner wrote of Ovitz: "I do not trust hi1n. 
None of the people he works with feels comfortable with his directness 
and honesty. . . . The biggest problem is that nobody trusts him, for he 
cannot tell the truth.''247 The court suggested that this writing did not 
reflect Eisner's true feelings about Ovitz because it was written shortly 
after Eisner's mother's death.248 In a later letter, explaining the reasons 
for Ovitz's tertnination, which was drafted but never sent to Ovitz, 
Eisner wrote, "When we talked last Friday, I told you again that my 
biggest problem was that you played the angles too much. I told you 
98% of the problem was that I did not know when you were telling the 
truth, about big things, about small things .... "249 Still, the court 
adopted a benign reading of-Eisner's view of Ovitz; namely, that Ovitz 
had a tendency to engage in "salesmanship" or "agenting" and would 
thus stretch the truth in order to get his way.250 
After Ovitz's termination was announced, Eisner sent an e-mail to 
Disney's head of public relations in which he called Ovitz "totally 
245. Id at 718. 
246. Id 
24 7. ld at 720 n.l86. 
248. Id at 720. 
249. Id at 727. The opinion omitted '"exaggerated the truth too far, manipulated me 
and others too much.'" Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 62, at I. The court omits the 
next sentence: "'And while you were telling me that those dishonest days were over, you 
were deceiving me on a specific matter.'" ld at 17. The court discounts the significance of 
this letter because Eisner characterized it as '"not accurate, way exaggerated, silly, 
hyperbole.'" In re Disney, 901 A.2d at 727. Eisner wrote the letter as part of an attempt to 
"put Ovitz on notice that he was no longer welcome at Disney." Id However, the letter 
indicates that Eisner spoke with Ovitz about his veracity problems on several occasions. See 
Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 62, at 17 ('"As we've discussed many times, we all 
never knew when you were telling things the way they were."'). 
250. In re Disney, 901 A.2d at 720. 
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incompetent" and a "psychopath."251 Although at trial Eisner claims he 
did not even know what the words in the letter meant (a claim the court 
found persuasive),252 the letter is actually quite clear on Eisner's 
understanding of the word "psychopath": "'He is a psychopath 
(Doesn't know right from wrong), cannot tell the truth. Basically he 
has a character problem, too devious, too untrustworthy to everybody, 
and only out for hirnself. "'253 Similarly, Litvack testified that "Ovitz 
would 'handle' Litvack and 'put his spin on things,"' but the court 
noted the worst lies Litvack could remember were trivial fibs like: "'I 
was on the phone with someone important and couldn't be on time for 
the meeting.'''254 The court concluded there was no concrete evidence 
that Ovitz ever told a material falsehood and the trivial statements 
attributed to Ovitz by Litvack did not suffice to constitute gross 
negligence or malfeasance, the standard necessary for termination "for 
ca\J1Se."2ss 
On December 10, 1996, Disney's Executive Perfortnance Plan 
Committee met. Russell recornn1ended Ovitz be granted a $7.5 
million bonus despite his poor performance.256 No member of the 
committee objected to this suggestion, apparently because they were 
under the impression that Disney was obligated to pay Ovitz a bonus, 
although the OEA clearly states the bonus is discretionary.257 Two days 
later, Disney issued a press release announcing that Ovitz would leave 
the company, effective January 31, 1997.258 At that point, "[T]he 
Disney board had never met in order to vote on, or even discuss, the 
termination . . . and few if any directors did an independent 
investigation of whether Ovitz could be terminated for cause."259 
251. Id at 738. 
252. Id (quoting Ovitz as describing the letter "as his effort at 'venting' and that 
'although [he] didn't know what the words meant, [he] was just so angry"'). Though Eisner's 
evaluation of Ovitz as a psychopath may not rise to the level of an authoritative clinical 
diagnosis, his letter makes his meaning very clear, and Eisner's evaluation ofOvitz's character 
is significant whether or not he used the ternt "psychopath" correctly. If Eisner does not 
know what the term ''totally incompetent" means, one wonders why a court should defer to 
his business judgment as to whether Ovitz could have been terminated for cause. 
25 3. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 62, at 17. 
254. In re Disney, 901 A.2d at 720. 
255. ld at 720 n.19l. 
256. ld at 734. 
257. Id On December 20, 1996, Disney's Executive Perfonnance Plan Committee 
met for the sole purpose of rescinding Ovitz's bonus. Eisner then accelerated Ovitz's 
departure date to December 27, 1996. Id at 739. 
258. Id at 735. 
259. Id at 736. 
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Ovitz subsequently was awarded a severance package worth 
approximately $140 million.260 Crystal later said that no one ever 
bothered to work out the numbers on the severance provisions in the· 
OEA.261 If they had, according to plaintiffs, they would have noticed 
that the OEA set up perverse incentives for Ovitz, permitting him to 
make more money if he left Disney pursuant to the NFT provision of 
the OEA than he could if he stayed in his position for the full five-year 
term.262 Crystal described Ovitz's severance package under the OEA 
as "shocking."263 
b. The Misplaced Rule 
Because the Rule, bolstered by the liability protection provided by 
§ 102(b)(7) of Delaware's General Corporation Law, applied to this 
case, the court found that the standard applicable to the review of the 
defendants' decisions relating to the hiring and firing of Ovitz was 
good faith: "[T]he concept of intentional dereliction of duty; a 
conscious disregard for ones responsib1lities, is an appropriate 
(although not the only) standard for detennining whether fiduciaries 
have acted in good faith."264 The court, thus constrained by existing 
jurisprudence, was compelled to find that the defendants could not be 
held liable, though the Chancellor felt compelled to point out the 
enormous gulf separating the conduct of the Disney board from ideal 
practices.265 The court was especially harsh in its characterization of 
Michael Eisner's management style: 
260. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 248-49 (Del. 2000). 
261. See id. at 251 (quoting Crystal as stating that '"no one added up the total cost of 
the severance package"'); id at 261 ( · ing the complaint as alleging that "neither 
Crystal nor the Old Board made the calculations that Crystal-the expert now believes he 
should have made"). 
262. Id; see In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 759 (noting the plaintiffs' expert witness opined 
that the OEA "improperly incentivized Ovitz to leave the Company and receive an NFT, 
rather than complete the tenn of the OEA"). 
263. Brehm, 7 46 A.2d at 251. Chancellor Chandler described the severance payments 
as "breathtaking." In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 698. 
264. In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 755. 
265. See, e.g., id. at 760 ("For the future, many lessons of what not to do can be 
learned from defendants' conduct here."); id at 760 n.487 (describing the board as "supine or 
passive"); id. at 761 n.488 ("[T]he board's collective kowtowing in regard to Ovitz's hiring is 
also due to Eisner's desire to surround himself with yes men."); id (giving examples of 
"Eisner's success at surrounding himself with non-employee directors who would have 
sycophantic tendencies"); id at 763 (speaking of Eisner as "having enthroned himself as the 
omnipotent and infallible monarch of his personal Magic Kingdom"); id at 764 (remarking 
that it would have been better if Russell had sought to verify Ovitz 's representations as to his 
income from his finn, Creative Artists Agency); id. at 769-70 (suggesting it would have been 
better if the compensation committee had entertained a formal presentation from Crystal 
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By virtue of his Machiavellian (and imperial) nature as CEO ... , 
Eisner to a large extent is responsible for the failings in process that 
infected and handicapped the board's decisionmaking abilities. Eisner 
stacked his (and I intentionally write "his" as opposed to "the 
Company's") board of directors with friends and other acquaintances 
who, though not necessarily beholden to him in a legal sense, were 
certainly more willing to accede to his wishes and support him 
unconditionally than truly independent directors.266 
Although fmding that Eisner acted neither with gross negligence nor 
in bad faith, the court noted many lapses in Eisner's conduct in 
connection with Ovitz's hiring: 
He failed to keep the board as informed as he should have. He 
stretched the outer boundaries of his authority as CEO by acting 
without specific board direction or involvement. He prematurely issued 
a press release that placed significant pressure on the board to accept 
Ovitz and approve his compensation package in accordance with the 
press release. 267 
In sum, the court concluded, Eisner's conduct did not "comport with 
how fiduciaries of Delaware corporations are expected to act."268 
With respect to the rest of the board, the court did not find their 
conduct in connection with Ovitz's hiring commendable, but it did not 
violate any fiduciary duty.269 Similarly, with respect to the decision to 
pennit Ovitz's NFT, Disney's corporate charter pennitted the board to 
delegate authority to make decisions in such matters to Eisner, and, so 
they could not have violated any duty in connection with that 
termination.270 Invoking the divergence of standards of conduct and 
standards of care, the court concluded: "[T]he standards used to 
measure the conduct of fiduciaries under Delaware law are not the 
same standards used in determining good corporate govemance."271 
The case provides a telling illustration of the divergence of 
standards of conduct and standards of review under the Rule, first 
identified by Eisenberg.272 In its August 2005 opinion dismissing the 
complaint on all counts, the Delaware Chancery Court noted that 
before the board relied on his analysis); id at 771 (conceding that directors Poitier and 
Lozano "may appear casual or uninfottned"). 
266. Id at 760-61 (footnote omitted). 
267. Id at 762-63. 
268. ld at 763. 
269. Id at 772. 
270. ld at 776. 
271. Id at 772 
272. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 440-44. 
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"there are many aspects of defendants' conduct that fell significantly 
short of the best practices of ideal corporate govemance."273 The 
question is, in contexts such as the Disney compensation case, does 
granting directors the benefits of the Rule help the corporation or help 
shareholders? The clear answer is the Rule accomplishes neither goal, 
even if we believe that, despite the bad outcome in this case, the board 
did the right thing in: (a) hiring (or approving the hiring of) Ovitz to 
be its President, (b) approving the OEA that provided for a $140 
million severance payment to Ovitz after only 14 months in office, and 
(c) determining that Ovitz could not be frred for cause. That is, hiring 
Ovitz might have looked like a good idea for Disney in 1995 and 
offering him a generous severance package might have been necessary 
given that Ovitz was giving up his share in a very profitable 
partnership.274 A court could also conclude that the Disney directors 
engaged in a reasonable inquiry and properly concluded that Ovitz 
could not be fired for cause in 1996. 
But the Rule does not permit a court to engage in such a 
reasonable inquiry. Instead, a court has to excuse what it recognizes as 
misconduct on the part of corporate directors, whether or not that 
misconduct results in hartn to the corporation and its shareholders: 
"Eisner's failure to better involve the board in the process of Ovitz's 
hiring, usurping that role for himself . . . does not comport with how 
fiduciaries of Delaware corporations are expected to act."275 Moreover, 
because courts treat the Rule as creating an evidentiary preswnption or 
as a standard of review, it does nothing to protect corporations (and 
their shareholders) from the reputational harms that accompany 
protracted litigation. The corporation is thus subjected to years of 
costly litigation, including a humiliating trial in which Disney's 
corporate governance practices were inspected under a microscope. 
The corporation has spent years embroiled in litigation that is 
expensive in attorneys' fees, resources, morale, and reputational harm, 
and the shareholders will not see any upside to all the Sturm und 
Drangto which the corporation is thereby subjected. 
The Disney case highlights the disastrous consequences the 
deployment of the Rule can have in the context of shareholder 
challenges to executive pay. First, the problem nicely illustrates the 
ways in which executive compensation packages can include NFT 
2 73. In re Disney, 901 A.2d at 697. 
274. Jd at 701 (stating that the success of Ovitz's business "translated into an annual 
income of $20 million for Ovitz"). 
275. Id at 763. 
• 
2007] BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 885 
clauses that protect executives' generous severance packages in almost 
all circt1mstances.276 Such clauses not only protect executives' 
interests; they protect boards from having to concede that they 
authorized generous salaries, retirement, and postretirement benefits to 
incompetent managers or to managers whose improprieties do not 
quite rise to the level of actionable fraud. The fact that no one at a 
corporation could work with an executive because they found him 
completely untrustworthy should be grounds for tennination for cause, 
and a court should be permitted to investigate whether a board that 
approves a contract that does not permit for termination for cause in 
such circt1mstances should be held liable for negligence. 
The Disney board's conduct in hiring Ovitz illustrates Bebchuk 
and Fried's argument about how one-sided the process of executive 
hiring_ can be.277 Eisner and Ovitz had been friends for twenty-five 
years when Eisner recruited Ovitz for Disney.278 Because Eisner's 
compensation package would have to be at least as generous as that of 
his subordinate, Eisner and the board he controlled had every reason to 
make Ovitz's compensation package as generous as possible. Eisner's 
personal lawyer, Russell,279 negotiated on behalf of Disney, and Russell 
was paid $250,000 for his role in closing the deal with Ovitz.280 He 
thus became invested in the transaction and would naturally be 
inclined to support it. Tenns of Ovitz's compensation package were 
cat11ouflaged to such an extent that even those who created them did 
not recognize the potential they entailed for creating perverse 
incentives}81 In such circumstances, shareholders could not possibly 
have been reasonably well infonned of the terms of Ovitz's 
compensation package. In the context of executive compensation, the 
Rule precludes a court from even considering whether structural bias 
on ,a board such as, Disney's led directors to prioritize- their own 
interests in the-transaction and their own ties to Eisner and Ovitz over 
their duties to Disney and its shareholders. 
The Disney case also illustrates why the Rule-, conceived as an 
abstention doctrine designed to protect corporations from disclosure of 
confidential infort11ation relating to its prospective business plans, 
276. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 126, at 812 (noting narrow def'"tnitions of "for 
cause" termination are now standard in executive employment contracts). 
277. SeeBEBCHUK&FRIED, supra note 47, at 2. 
2 78. In re J)isney, 901 A.2d at 699. 
279. Id at 761 n.488. 
. . . 
280. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 62, at 11. 
281. Seeln re Disney, 907 A.2d at 760 (stating that the board members were ordinarily 
negligent in the hiring ofOvitz and the approval ofthe OEA). 
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should have no application to cases involving challenges to executive 
compensation. While the decision to hire Ovitz might have been 
related to such prospective business plans, the contours of his 
compensation were determined with reference to standard pay 
packages for executives at other corporations and with reference to the 
pay for other Disney executives. Disney would suffer no irreparable 
harm from the disclosure of such information, and, of course, the 
information comes out anyway in litigation in which the Rule operates 
as a standard of review or as an evidentiary presumption. 
The director-primacy model contends that the organizational 
efficiencies of the corporation better achieve the aim of shareholder 
wealth maximization through authority-based, decision-making 
processes than would a consensual shareholder-primacy model that 
pennits shareholder action to trump board action.282 Shareholder 
action is rare, as the director-primacy model acknowledges.283 But 
shareholder action is rare because, in most circumstances, shareholders 
would rather switch than fight recognizing that individual 
shareholders gain more from moving their money out of a poorly 
managed corporation and into a better one than from seeking to 
improve the management of a corporation in which they have invested 
through shareholder litigation.284 On the rare occasions when 
shareholders are moved to challenge board action, absent a claim that 
the corporation will be damaged in the discovery process, a court 
should be permitted to determine when a board takes an action that is 
not in the interests of the corporation. The Ovitz transaction may or 
may not have been in the interests of Disney. The Rule prevents the 
Delaware courts from making any such determination, and, so 
deployed, the Rule impedes the adjudication of shareholder rights and 
interests, prevents shareholder actions from constraining boards, 
promotes board passivity, and thus permits negligent boards to cause 
economic harm to corporations and their shareholders. 
Finally, as demonstrated in the Disney litigation, the Rule pertnits 
officers and directors to tread very delicately near the line that 
separates poor management from wasteful mismanagement and 
282. See Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 572 (touting the authority-based structure of the 
corporation as its "chief economic virtue"); Bainbridge, supra note 112, at 1654 (noting 
shareholder power undennines the purpose of authority-based, decision-making structures 
which achieve efficiency by concentrating discretionary authority in the board). 
283. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 557-58. 
284. See id (discussing shareholders' "rational apathy"); Romano, supra note 82, at 55 
(noting the cost of bringing suit "is typically greater than a shareholder-plaintiff's pro rata 
benefit''). 
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thereby nullifies any incentive they might have to perform better. In 
the. case of decisions relating to executive pay, there is no reason why 
directors should not be liable for breaches of the duty of care under the 
generally applicable standard of care: '•[T]he care an ordinarily 
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circum-
stances."285 The purpose of imposing personal liability on directors for 
breaches of their duties of care and loyalty is to align their incentives 
with shareholders' interests.286 To the extent the Rule interferes with 
. . . . . 
the achievement of this goal, it undercuts the main thrust of reforms in 
corporate governance since the 1990s, which has sought further to 
align officers' and directors' incentives with those of shareholders. 287 
N. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this Article has been two-fold. First, the Article seeks 
to demonstrate existing rationales for the Rule are unsatisfactory and 
the two most cormnon understandings of the Rule, the Rule as 
evidentiary presumption and the Rule as standard of review, lead 
courts to engage in substantive review of board decisions in 
circumstances where they really ought to abstain from any such 
review. Both of these problems regarding dominant understandings of 
the Rule derive from a tendency to view the Rule as a means of 
protecting the corporations' directors rather than as a mechanism for 
protecting corporations themselves from hanns they might suffer 
through litigation. 
Second, the Article proposes a new rationale for the Rule: the 
Rule ought to be deployed as an abstention doctrine to preclude a court 
from undertaking substantive review of a_ board's decisions when 
challenges to those decisions would require the corporation to disclose 
its prospective business plans. The Article suggests the Rule would 
thus often apply in the context of decisions relating to acquisitions and 
mergers and to the issuance of dividends, but it would rarely apply in 
the context of shareholder challenges to decisions relating to executive 
compensation. As illustrated in the recent litigation relating to 
Disney's hiring and firing of Ovitz, such decisions do not implicate 
any long-term plans of the corporation, and the corporation is not 
285. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT§ 8.30 (1998). 
286. Romano, supmnote 82, at 55. 
287. See KHURANA, supra note 136, at xiv (arguing investor capitalism has superseded 
managerial capitalism and yet still faulting the search for executives as valuing charisma over 
competence); Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 562-63 (arguing the recent trend of compensating 
directors with stock has better aligned directors' interests with those of shareholders). 
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harmed any more by a full inquiry into the propriety of decisions 
relating to executive compensation than it is by an inquiry limited by 
the dictates of the Rule when it is treated as either a presumption or a 
standard of review. The Rule should not be at play in executive 
compensation cases and other contexts in which the discovery process 
does not threaten to compel disclosure of prospective business plans, 
because, in such contexts, the Rule frustrates the purpose underlying 
shareholder litigation: holding directors to account for their failure to 
perform their fiduciary duties in a manner consistent with shareholder 
interests. 
